National Parliaments and the ECJ: A View from the Bundestag

Abstract

The German government largely disregards impending decisions of the ECJ, even if those decisions have far-reaching implications for Germany. Decisions of the Court may, however, be useful for the opposition in securing its policy preferences. Equal treatment decisions are used to evaluate expectations about legislative anticipation of Court decisions.

Enter at your own risk: free movement of EU citizens in practice

“…Firstly, containing compliance by simply remaining passive is easier to sustain for some domestic actors than for others. For example, when confronted with an unwelcome ruling of the ECJ, national legislatures may opt for a 'wait and see' approach (Slagter 2009), and yet national administrations can be confronted with an increasing number of individual claims based on directly effective ECJ jurisprudence. Under these circumstances, active containment may become necessary for member state administrations.…”

The Cultural Role of Civil Societies and the National Parliament in the Domestic Enforcement of International Laws on Corruption in Tanzania

“…The local context of countries has a bearing on the enforcement of international laws on corruption because the domestication of such laws varies from country to country. The national legislatures, including the one in Tanzania, remain critical national organs responsible for legalizing and enforcing various international laws at the country level (Cortell & Davis, 1996;Checkel, 1999;Kelley, 2004;Hafner-Burton, 2005;Slagter, 2009;Verdier & Versteeg, 2017). Although Squatrito (2016) pinpoints that scholars need to be more knowledgeable of the domestic enforcement of international law, studies focusing on the culture of civil societies and the Parliament in enforcing international law on corruption at the domestic level are scant.…”

“…Although the motivation for the domestication of international law varies across countries (see Cortell & Davis, 1996;Checkel, 1999;Kelley, 2004;Hafner-Burton, 2005;Slagter, 2009), national legislatures, including the one in Tanzania, remain critical national organs to legalize and enforce various international laws at the country level. Squatrito (2016) pinpoints a need for more knowledge of the domestication of international law across countries.…”

Domestic legislatures and international human rights law: Legislating on religious symbols in Europe

“…Third, legislators have motivations to reconcile legislation with a state's international commitments in order to avoid sanctioning by courts. Lawmakers often adapt their behavior in anticipation of costly judicial oversight (Stone Sweet 2000;Slagter 2009) and rulings that would find noncompliance. By annulling legislation or requiring states to remedy wrongs caused by noncompliance, judicial oversight may cause legislators to lose the support of constituents.…”