Nationalism, Patriotism, and Support for the European Union

Huddy, Leonie; Ponte, Alessandro Del; Davies, Caitlin L.

doi:10.1111/pops.12731

Cited by 30 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…In line with previous studies (e.g., Latcheva 2011;Satherly et al 2019;Wagner et al 2012;Huddy et al 2021), a relatively high factor correlation between patriotism and nationalism of over 0.57 was found in the Ariely model, which might originate from the pride item batteries used for both patriotism and liberal nationalism. In a similar vein, the model of Fleiß et al also showed a factor correlation of 0.44 between patriotism and the second factor of nationalism (NAT 2), consisting of pride items only.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 91%

“…Compared with nationalism, the nation is assumed to be bound not by ethnic, but by civic criteria such as loyalty to political institutions. In this sense, patriotism is associated with a more heterogeneous notion of the people and with a rather broad and inclusive definition of membership and belonging (Blank and Schmidt 2003;Kronenberg 2013;Huddy et al 2021). Given these associations, a wide array of studies have shed empirical light on the negative relationship between patriotism and anti-immigration attitudes (Blank and Schmidt 2003;Wagner et al 2012;Heinrich 2020; for an opposing view, see Cohrs et al 2004).…”

Section: Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nationalism and patriotism are fuzzy, yet much used and popular, concepts. While the former is generally understood as an aggressive, supremacist and uncritical attitude towards the nation and is considered to be on the rise (see Bonikowski 2016;Mylonas and Tudor 2021), the latter is termed an enlightened sense of community that takes pride in a commitment to democratic values (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989;Karasawa 2002;Blank and Schmidt 2003;Davidov 2009;Satherly et al 2019;Huddy et al 2021). The implication is that nationalism has to be curtailed (e.g., Mounk 2018), whereas patriotism is promoted as a civic virtue (MacIntyre 1995;Ben-Porath 2007;Costa 2020) and as a socially desirable goal worth striving for.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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We do not measure what we aim to measure: Testing Three Measurement Models for Nationalism and Patriotism

Mußotter

2021

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The measurement models for both nationalism and patriotism originally developed by Blank and Schmidt are broadly established. Despite their widespread usage in Germany and beyond, concerns have been voiced about the operationalisation of these nation-related concepts. However, in previous scholarship little attention has been devoted to systematically reviewing the models’ validity. This paper’s major goal is to contribute substantially to research on operationalising national attitudes by thoroughly examining how both nationalism and patriotism are measured and how valid the predominant measurement models really are. By running a confirmatory factor analysis, three measurement models based on the ISSP data of 2003 are replicated and empirically reviewed. By conducting a single-country analysis, the models are tested for the German case, including the evaluation of measurement invariance for both Eastern and Western Germany. Although the selected measurement models yield satisfying results, the paper identifies considerable shortcomings with regard to the way both nationalism and patriotism are empirically approached. It calls for a reconceptualising of the prevailing concept of pride and thus challenges the predominant operationalisation.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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We do not measure what we aim to measure: Testing Three Measurement Models for Nationalism and Patriotism

Mußotter

2021

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“… 2. Nationalist beliefs and claims also involve judgments about the nation’s superiority vis-à-vis other countries, i.e., chauvinism (Huddy, Del Ponte, and Davies 2021; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). In the interest of streamlining our analyses, however, we do not consider chauvinist frames in the present study.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Politics as Usual? Measuring Populism, Nationalism, and Authoritarianism in U.S. Presidential Campaigns (1952–2020) with Neural Language Models

Bonikowski

Luo²,

Stuhler³

2022

Sociological Methods & Research

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Radical-right campaigns commonly employ three discursive elements: anti-elite populism, exclusionary and declinist nationalism, and authoritarianism. Recent scholarship has explored whether these frames have diffused from radical-right to centrist parties in the latter’s effort to compete for the former’s voters. This study instead investigates whether similar frames had been used by mainstream political actors prior to their exploitation by the radical right (in the U.S., Donald Trump’s 2016 and 2020 campaigns). To do so, we identify instances of populism, nationalism (i.e., exclusionary and inclusive definitions of national symbolic boundaries and displays of low and high national pride), and authoritarianism in the speeches of Democratic and Republican presidential nominees between 1952 and 2020. These frames are subtle, infrequent, and polysemic, which makes their measurement difficult. We overcome this by leveraging the affordances of neural language models—in particular, a robustly optimized variant of bidirectional encoder representations from Transformers (RoBERTa) and active learning. As we demonstrate, this approach is more effective for measuring discursive frames than other methods commonly used by social scientists. Our results suggest that what set Donald Trump’s campaign apart from those of mainstream presidential candidates was not the invention of a new form of politics, but the combination of negative evaluations of elites, low national pride, and authoritarianism—all of which had long been present among both parties—with an explicit evocation of exclusionary nationalism, which had been articulated only implicitly by prior presidential nominees. Radical-right discourse—at least at the presidential level in the United States—should therefore be characterized not as a break with the past but as an amplification and creative rearrangement of existing political-cultural tropes.

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“…In general, the correlation mechanism between patriotism and pandemic prevention policies lies in the theory of social identity, and this identity may have a tendency to become polarized with the practice and results of governance policy in different countries. Unlike patriotism, which emphasizes in-group identification, 15 nationalism which emphasizes out-group exclusion, may have a similar effect. Su 16 uses data from the United States to demonstrate that public support for policies depends on whether nationalist policies are consistent with their ideological orientation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Social Media Influences Public Attitudes to COVID-19 Governance Policy: An Analysis Based on Cognitive-Affective Model

Han¹,

Xu²

2022

PRBM

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Introduction Based on the cognitive-affective model, this paper examines how social media affects the public cognitive and affective factors, further influence their attitudes towards COVID-19 governance policy. Methods Through an online survey, we measured individual COVID-19 policy attitude, social media use and other related factors of 1222 respondents from 12 countries, and based on this, we carried out regression and mediation analysis on the data to obtain the research results. Results From the perspective of cognitive factors, the public perception of the severity of the COVID-19 itself does not significantly affect their attitudes towards governance policy. On the contrary, the evaluation on government governance performance, risks and governance anticipations have more significant impacts. Among the affective factors, personal anxiety and patriotism significantly affect the formation of public attitudes, personal anxiety is positively correlated, and patriotism is negatively correlated. It is important to note that nationalism has no significant influence on public attitudes to COVID-19 policy on a global scale. Conclusion (1) Social media influences the public COVID-19 policy attitudes through their moderating effect on affective and cognitive factors. (2) The impact of social media on affective pathways is more significant than that on cognitive pathways. (3) The positive moderating effect of social media on patriotism obscures the tendency of strict governance of COVID-19 caused by aggravating people’s anxiety.

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Nationalism, Patriotism, and Support for the European Union

Cited by 30 publications

References 59 publications

We do not measure what we aim to measure: Testing Three Measurement Models for Nationalism and Patriotism

We do not measure what we aim to measure: Testing Three Measurement Models for Nationalism and Patriotism

Politics as Usual? Measuring Populism, Nationalism, and Authoritarianism in U.S. Presidential Campaigns (1952–2020) with Neural Language Models

How Social Media Influences Public Attitudes to COVID-19 Governance Policy: An Analysis Based on Cognitive-Affective Model

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