Theorists of liberal nationalism argue that national identities serve as essential glue binding a nation. However, national identities can create tensions among subgroups of co-nationals and breed suspicion of outsiders. This chapter analyses the psychology of national attachments to better understand the effects of national identity, identifying three types of national attachment: chauvinism, pride, and identity. The chapter then investigates their differing origins and consequences, focusing on their effects on support for globalization, such as attitudes towards protectionism and immigration. The chapter finds that national chauvinism undercuts and pride enhances support for globalization, underscoring the diverse political effects of national attachments.

Does attachment to a nation enhance or dampen support for the European Union (EU)? Using the 2003 and 2013 ISSP national‐identity modules, we isolate and provide multi‐item measures of two distinct types of national attachment—nationalism and patriotism. We find that they are positively related yet have divergent effects. We validate the measures showing that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, support for nationalistic policies (anti‐immigration and protectionism) as expected. We then test the effects of nationalism and patriotism on EU attitudes and find that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, opposition to the EU. The presence of a neo‐nationalist political party enhanced the effects of nationalism on opposition to the EU, underscoring the importance of political rhetoric in shaping nationalistic EU opposition. In further support of the rhetoric hypothesis, the most‐educated nationalists are most likely to oppose the EU in countries with a neo‐nationalist political party and vote for such parties when present.

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Should a government repay its international debts even if this imposes severe hardships on its citizens? Drawing on moral psychology, we investigate when people think a government is morally obligated to pay its debts. Participants read about a government that has to decide whether to default on its debt payments or cut vital programs. Across conditions, we varied the number of jobs at stake and whether a full or partial default is required to save them. Overall, most participants judged that a government should pay its debt even when the damage to the debtor is greater than the benefit to the lender. As the damage to the debtor became extreme, participants increasingly said the government should default, but they still judged that defaulting is morally wrong. In Experiment 2, we find in a national sample of Americans that political conservatives were more opposed to default than liberals. We discuss implications for policy, public opinion, and public welfare during economic downturns.

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