Natural Categories and Human Kinds

Khalidi, Muhammad Ali

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511998553

Cited by 152 publications

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“…As recent controversies about natural kinds illustrate (e.g. Khalidi 2013;Ludwig 2015b;Slater 2015), however, a general conventionalism about scientific ontologies is highly controversial. Insofar my argument depends on such a conventionalism, it will arguably be considered a non-starter by most proponents of VFI.…”

Section: Explanatory Interests and Natural Kindsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some kinds are epistemically more fruitful than others because they have certain features. Many current accounts of natural kinds with metaphysical ambitions rely on claims about property clustering-whether characterized as ''stable property clusters'' in general (Slater 2015), causally unified property clusters (Khalidi 2013;cf. Craver 2009), or more specifically homeostatic property clusters (Wilson et al 2007).…”

Section: Brigandt 2009)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal

Ludwig

2015

Erkenn

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The aim of this article is to argue that ontological choices in scientific practice undermine common formulations of the value-free ideal in science. First, I argue that the truth values of scientific statements depend on ontological choices. For example, statements about entities such as species, race, memory, intelligence, depression, or obesity are true or false relative to the choice of a biological, psychological, or medical ontology. Second, I show that ontological choices often depend on non-epistemic values. On the basis of these premises, I argue that it is often neither possible nor desirable to evaluate scientific statements independently of non-epistemic values. Finally, I suggest that considerations of ontological choices do not only challenge the value-free ideal but also help to specify positive roles of non-epistemic values in an often neglected area of scientific practice.

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Section: Explanatory Interests and Natural Kindsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Brigandt 2009)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal

Ludwig

2015

Erkenn

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“…Sin embargo, al contrario de lo que creía Locke, los autores que agrupamos en esta línea integradora consideran que es posible descubrir y caracterizar los géneros naturales, así como comprender y formular su dimensión causal, expresada en términos de principio general, es decir, entendido como membresía natural (Boyd 1988, 1991, 2010, Keller et al 2003, Wilson et al 2007, Khalidi 2013, Slater 2015. Nótese que en esta línea integradora, al igual que en la perspectiva de Locke, se apunta a una distinción bidimensional de las propiedades que determinan el género natural en cuestión: las propiedades o mecanismos causalmente determinantes y las propiedades determinadas.…”

Section: Aproximaciones Realistas De Género Natural Vs Locke: Respueunclassified

“…De hecho, muchos géneros, como las especies biológicas, el litio, el plutonio, etc. son considerados por autores afines a esta corriente integradora como géneros naturales genuinos (Boyd 1999, Khalidi 2013. Por esta serie de razones, se puede afirmar que Locke es más convencionalista y escéptico que los autores de esta corriente integradora de género natural, ya que Locke considera que las esencias reales son desconocidas y que las clasificaciones son, principalmente, producto de nuestra capacidad para la abstracción.…”

Section: Aproximaciones Realistas De Género Natural Vs Locke: Respueunclassified

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Debate actual sobre los géneros naturales desde una perspectiva lockeana

Martínez

2016

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ResumenEl objetivo del presente trabajo es, por un lado, reivindicar la importancia e influencia del enfoque de Locke para la discusión sobre los géneros naturales y, por otro, mostrar cómo su visión y aportaciones en torno al sistema de clasificación natural resultan de gran utilidad para entender en profundidad la compleja geografía del debate contemporáneo sobre estos géneros. En particular, ofrecemos una interpretación según la cual las concepciones de género natural se comprenden como críticas realistas a la posición que sostiene Locke y mostramos cómo una importante tensión que aflora en su propuesta reaparece en el actual debate sobre los géneros naturales. Palabras clave: Locke, metafísica, esencia real, esencia nominal, géneros naturales, epistemología. AbstractThe main objective in this paper is to defend the influence of Locke's perspective in the discussion of natural kinds. The aim is to arrive at an in-depth understanding of the current debate of natural kinds using Locke's view on natural classification system. I believe this brief incursion into Locke's perspective and examination of his contributions to the debate will serve as a useful tool for gaining a better understanding of the geography of the contemporary debate concerning natural kinds. Also, it should be noted that Locke's contributions to the contemporary philosophical discussion are crucial to gain a clear understanding of ideas that are very much current today.

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Species Problem – A Philosophical Analysis

Richards

2014

Encyclopedia of Life Sciences

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The ‘species problem’ is that there are multiple ways to conceive species that divide up biodiversity in inconsistent ways. Monistic responses to the species problem seek a single universal species concept, no single concept seems adequate though. Pluralistic responses recognise multiple species concepts, based on differences across biodiversity, theoretical interests or the functioning of concepts. But if what counts as a species taxon depends on human interests it isn't clear that species concepts divide biodiversity into real units and ‘cut nature at its joints’ in a straightforward way. The reality of species also seems to depend on their metaphysical status: what basic kinds of things are they? Some argue that species are sets of organisms, based on real essences, clusters of properties or historical relations. Others argue that they are spatiotemporally restricted individuals analogous to organisms. Key Concepts: The species problem is the use of multiple inconsistent species concepts that divide biodiversity in different ways. Monism is the view that correctly understood, there is only one kind of species thing. Natural kinds are groupings that are independent of human conventions and preferences, and are studied by science. Pluralism is the view that there are two or more kinds of species things. Pragmatic pluralism is the view that organisms can be grouped into species on the basis of different research interests. Realism is the view that species taxa are real and independent of human conventions. The species‐as‐individuals thesis is that species are historical individuals with beginnings, endings, change over time and cohesion. Organisms are ‘parts’ of a species. The species‐as‐sets thesis is that species are sets of organisms, where set inclusion is determined by intrinsic or extrinsic properties. Organisms are ‘members’ of a species.

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Natural Categories and Human Kinds

Cited by 152 publications

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Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal

Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal

Debate actual sobre los géneros naturales desde una perspectiva lockeana

Species Problem – A Philosophical Analysis

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