Natural kinds as nodes in causal networks

Khalidi, Muhammad Ali

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0841-y

Cited by 45 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…These generalizations run along two dimensions of projectability: first, generality, that is, the projections cover all members of a kind. And, second, variety, that is, each kind supports many, many different generalizations (Khalidi 2015). Moreover, this is not only about inductive capacity, since kinds exhibit indeed a broader epistemic fertility, in the sense that they further support our scientific taxonomic and explanatory practices.…”

Section: Essences As Superexplanatorymentioning

confidence: 97%

“…11 The causal structure of a natural kind might not be as simple as I am picturing it here. For Khalidi (2015), natural kinds are defined by multiple networks of causal properties. Causal relationships might thus not be strictly "horizontal" and "one-to-many" as I sketched them.…”

Section: Essences As Superexplanatorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…natural kinds (Boyd 1980(Boyd , 1991(Boyd , 1999a(Boyd , 1999bCraver 2009;Khalidi 2013Khalidi , 2015Millikan 1999Millikan , 2000Wilson 1999 properties in common with silver qua members of that group. In particular, they also are highly lightreflecting metals, as well as excellent conductors of electricity and heat.…”

Section: Essences As Superexplanatorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Putting modal metaphysics first

Mallozzi

2018

Synthese

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I propose that we approach the epistemology of modality by putting modal metaphysics first and, specifically, by investigating the metaphysics of essence. Following a prominent Neo-Aristotelian view, I hold that metaphysical necessity depends on the nature of things, namely their essences. I further clarify that essences are core properties having distinctive superexplanatory powers. In the case of natural kinds, which is my focus in the paper, superexplanatoriness is due to the fact that the essence of a kind is what causes all the many properties and behaviors that are typically shared by all the instances of the kind. Accordingly, we know what is necessarily true of kinds by knowing what is essential to them in the sense of actually playing such causal-explanatory roles. Modal reasoning aimed at discovering metaphysical necessity thus proceeds via essentialist deduction: we move from essentialist truths to reach necessary truths.

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Section: Essences As Superexplanatorymentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Essences As Superexplanatorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Putting modal metaphysics first

Mallozzi

2018

Synthese

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“…Property clustering is supposed to capture the observation that scientific kinds tend to differ from Dupré 's "gastronomic kinds" in supporting a large variety of inferences. Other authors have modified Boyd's proposal by dropping the requirement of homeostatic mechanisms (Slater 2015) or providing a more general account of the causes of property clustering (Khalidi 2015). However, none of the mentioned authors wants to turn the clock back to monism or to relativism.…”

Section: Realism : Convergence Metaphysicians May Suspect That This Nmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revamping the Metaphysics of Ethnobiological Classification

Ludwig¹

2018

Current Anthropology

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Ethnobiology has a long tradition of metaphysical debates about the "naturalness,""objectivity", "reality", and "universality" of classifications. Especially the work of Brent Berlin has been influential in developing a "convergence metaphysics" that explains cross-cultural similarities of knowledge systems through shared recognition of objective discontinuities in nature. Despite its influence on the development of the field, convergence metaphysics has largely fallen out of favor as contemporary ethnobiologists tend to emphasize the locality and diversity of classificatory practices.The aim of this article is twofold: First, I provide a historical account of the rise and fall of convergence metaphysics in ethnobiology. I show how convergence metaphysics emerged as an innovative theoretical program in the wake of the "cognitive revolution" and the "modern evolutionary synthesis" but failed to incorporate both theoretical insights and political concerns that gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, I develop a positive proposal of how to engage with metaphysical issues in ethnobiology. By integrating traditional research on convergence of classifications with more nuanced accounts of distinctly local categories, a revamped metaphysics of ethnobiological classification can make substantial contributions to debates about ontological difference in anthropology and about the relation between applied and theoretical ethnobiology.

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“… The view I develop bears some similarities to Khalidi's view of natural kinds as nodes in causal networks. For instance, he states “[w]hat enables natural kind categories to play the role that they do in our inductive, explanatory, and taxonomic practices is that they consist of highly connected nodes in causal networks” (, 9). Since our focus is on social groups, I won't argue for a view of other social kinds, e.g., money, nations, recessions, or corporations, here. …”

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confidence: 99%

Social Structures and the Ontology of Social Groups

Ritchie

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Social groups—like teams, committees, gender groups, and racial groups—play a central role in our lives and in philosophical inquiry. Here I develop and motivate a structuralist ontology of social groups centered on social structures (i.e., networks of relations that are constitutively dependent on social factors). The view delivers a picture that encompasses a diverse range of social groups, while maintaining important metaphysical and normative distinctions between groups of different kinds. It also meets the constraint that not every arbitrary collection of people is a social group. In addition, the framework provides resources for developing a broader structuralist view in social ontology.

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Natural kinds as nodes in causal networks

Cited by 45 publications

References 18 publications

Putting modal metaphysics first

Putting modal metaphysics first

Revamping the Metaphysics of Ethnobiological Classification

Social Structures and the Ontology of Social Groups

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