Naturalism, theism, and multiply realizable mental states

Abstract

Paul Draper has argued that the scientific evidence for the dependence of mental states upon brain states provides a good reason for thinking that theism is very probably false because the extreme metaphysical dualism implied by theism makes it antecedently likely, if God exists, that minds should be fundamentally non-physical entities. However, Draper's argument assumes that what makes God's mind a mind is the immaterial stuff it is made of. But that assumption is potentially faulty. Why? Because, if functionalism is true, then all conceivable minds are fundamentally functional entities identified by what they do, rather than by what they are made of.

Peter Browne on the Metaphysics of Knowledge

“…21 Hence, these predicates cannot be applied in the same way to God and creatures, and the same is true of all other predicates. As mentioned above, Browne seems to see himself as a kind of Thomist, and Aquinas likewise 20 A functionalist analysis of divine mental states has recently been defended by Vandergriff (2018). strongly insists on divine simplicity, and sees it as a motivation for rejecting univocity (Aquinas,Summa Theologica,Iq3a6).…”

“… 20 A functionalist analysis of divine mental states has recently been defended by Vandergriff (2018). …”

Intentionality, belief, and the logical problem of evil

“…18.For instance, Vandergriff (2018) defends the application of a functionalist theory of mind to God's mental states.…”