Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Allen, Ronald J.

doi:10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i2.22446

Cited by 8 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…Obviously, much of this article is compatible with much of social epistemology, as the original Allen and Leiter, 2001, article noted. On social epistemology, see Fuller, 2002, andGoldman, 1999. sense 91 .…”

Section: Enoch Et Al Recognize the Limitations Of The Incentive Argumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I hesitate to venture far into unknown terrain, but I will observe the discordance between the general European and Spanish scholars' heavy emphasis on pursuing «truth» in civil dispute resolution and the inefficiencies of many of those systems which, in the pursuit of truth, avoid making mistakes by making it difficult to decide cases-indeed in some cases essentially impossible. But not deciding cases is to decide them, as the status quo favors one party or the other; thus, interminable delay in civil cases perpetuates the very same mistakes that the pursuit of truth is supposed to suppress 95 .…”

Section: Enoch Et Al Recognize the Limitations Of The Incentive Argumentioning

confidence: 99%

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Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Allen

2020

SSRN Journal

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This article revisits «Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence», published twenty years ago. The evolution of the relative plausibility theory of juridical proof is offered as evidence of the advantage of a naturalized approach to the study of the field and law of evidence. Various alternative explanations of juridical proof from other disciplines are examined and their shortcomings described. These competing explanations are similar in their reductive, a priori approaches that are at odds with an empirically oriented naturalized approach. The shortcomings of the various a priori approaches are driven by their common methodological commitments to employing weird hypotheticals to engage in intuition mining about the American legal systems that in turn ignore important aspects of the actual legal systems and consistently make impossible epistemological demands. As a result, both their descriptions of and prescriptions for American legal systems are implausible, unlike the relative plausibility theory.

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Section: Enoch Et Al Recognize the Limitations Of The Incentive Argumentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Enoch Et Al Recognize the Limitations Of The Incentive Argumentioning

confidence: 99%

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Allen

2020

SSRN Journal

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“… 6. A critique of this methodological choice can be found in Allen (2021), and a defence in Enoch (2021). More generally, on the use of intuitions as ‘evidence’ in philosophical literature, see Climenhaga (2018).…”

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confidence: 99%

A missing piece in the debate about naked statistical evidence

Giles

2023

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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In this article, I want to draw attention to a class of cases that is ignored, sometimes deliberately, in the debate about the probative value of naked statistical evidence (NSE). I am talking about cases in which ‘statistical’ propositions are the principal subject of proof. I will show that they are legally relevant and remain immune to the arguments against NSE put forward in the evidence literature. All of this, I will conclude, makes it convenient to pay more attention to them. First, I will highlight the hypothetical cases discussed in the NSE debate and the kind of propositions that must be proved in them: ‘singular’ propositions. Second, I will show that there are other cases, also relevant in legal systems, in which the principal factum probandum are ‘statistical’ propositions. Third, I will argue that this difference is substantial for the NSE debate.

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“…Such thought experiments are therefore far-removed from what criminal cases look like in practice. As a consequence, some authors suggest that such 'weird' hypotheticals are not especially useful for thinking about rational criminal proof (Allen, 2020;Fratantonio, 2021). 13 I also believe that examples which are overly stylized confuse more than they clarify.…”

Section: Remarks On Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, this argument is weak at best. Various authors have cast doubt on whether we can draw any conclusions from these intuitions as the cases to which they relate are unrealistic and underdescribed (Allen, 2020;Fratantonio, 2021). Additionally, there are numerous competing accounts that also explain these intuitions (e.g., Nunn, 2015;Krauss, 2019;Di Bello, 2019b;Dahlman, 2020a;Ross, 2020;Enoch & Spectre, 2021;Littlejohn, 2021;Smith, 2021;Dahlman & Pundik, 2021).…”

Section: Robustness As Insensitivity To New Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

(Im)probable stories

Jellema¹

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but also being not-quite-a-student was quite demotivating (especially when combined with COVID lockdowns). So, while I am satisfied with the end-result, my PhD experience was something of a mixed bag. However, one thing that I do not have mixed feelings about is the group of people who helped me along the way.The following persons not only helped make this thesis better, without their aid I would likely not have finished it in the first place.I would first and foremost like to thank my promotors Henry Prakken and Anne Ruth Mackor. Before I began this PhD, I already knew what you were both like as supervisors as you had supervised my master's thesis. After I was done with that thesis, I sent you an email in which I expressed my gratitude for your kind and constructive supervision. I observed that not everyone is as lucky with their supervisors (I'd heard some horror stories). I also made a prediction: that we would continue to get along well during my PhD. I am happy to say that this was a successful prediction and I stand by the words I wrote in that email. I am grateful for all the time that you devoted to reading my work carefully and critically over these past years. Admittedly, it was not always easy to feel this gratitude when I received yet another round of extensive comments on my work. However, if not for all your help, I wouldn't be nearly as satisfied with the end result and it made me a better academic. But what I am perhaps most thankful for is that I could always come to you with any problems I had, whether they were professional or personal, in the knowledge that you would offer me understanding, kind words, and good advice.A close third in the list of people that I should absolutely not forget to thank is Pauline Westerman. Pauline, you had very little impact on what is written in this thesis. When I showed you one of my first chapters, you refused to read it, 9 exclaiming with disgust that there was a formula on the second page. Nonetheless, you contributed to the successful completion of my PhD in countless other ways.Your first contribution was convincing me to apply for the Research Master of Law, which turned out to be a great choice. After that, you continued to be a mentor to me, and to many of my fellow PhDs as the director of the Graduate School of Law (and these days as the 'PhD (grand)mother'). You also helped me (and the other PhDs) immensely by organizing online meetings during the pandemic, where we talked about hobbies and other happy things. Those meetings were bright spots during a dull and depressing time. Finally I want to thank you very much for painting the wonderful picture on the cover of this book.I would also like to express my gratitude to the members of my reading committee: Amalia Amaya, Christian Dahlman and Bart Verheij. Thank you for taking the time to read this thesis, for your helpful feedback and for allowing me to defend it.Speaking of the defense, I am very happy that Pepa Mellema and Stefan Sleeuw agreed to be my paranymphs. Historically, paranymphs acted as bac...

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Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Cited by 8 publications

References 8 publications

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited

A missing piece in the debate about naked statistical evidence

(Im)probable stories

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