Naturalizing The Mind

Dretske, Fred

doi:10.7551/mitpress/4872.001.0001

Cited by 846 publications

(450 citation statements)

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“…Interestingly, it follows from this that affections, for Husserl, or low‐level “phenomenal contents” generally, are not some kind of meaningless, supervening surplus of intentional experience, as is one standard view in more recent representationalist philosophies of mind (e.g., Dretske ; Tye ; Byrne ). For Husserl, affective fields contain a sui generis kind of structure and affective meaning.…”

Section: Husserl's Theory Of Affective Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

Mazijk¹

2016

The Southern J of Philosophy

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This paper focuses on the contents of perception in Kant's first Critique and Husserl's later writings. Both Kant and Husserl are known for their appeal to synthesis in their transcendental accounts of perceptual experience and objective judgment. Especially regarding Kant, the precise nature of perceptual synthesis has recently been the cause of much debate. Whereas some argue that for Kant perception must have nonconceptual content, others believe he is a conceptualist. After offering an alternative solution to this interpretative problem in Kant's philosophy, I turn to Husserl's later theory of perception. My main claims here are that Husserl departs from Kant specifically regarding (i) the sort of synthetic contents that govern affective perception and (ii) the role of conceptual capacities in the contents of attentive perception.

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Section: Husserl's Theory Of Affective Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

Mazijk¹

2016

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…p.10); that is, the reading that makes L→PC true. Several philosophers (Byrne, ; Dretske, ; Tye, ) have endorsed L→PC and claimed that the phenomenal character of the experience cannot vary unless there is a change in the way things look to me. In this paper, I will give reasons for resisting the entailment from sameness in lookings to sameness in phenomenal character, and hence resist the conclusion that non‐transitivity of phenomenology follows from the non‐transitivity of lookings even if NTL is true…”

Section: The Intransitivity Of Lookingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Access, phenomenology and sorites

Sebastián

2018

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The non-transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is nontransitive-a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness.In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter-intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.

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“…(Chalmers 1996, 4)Qualia include the ways it feels to see, hear and smell, the way it feels to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have mental states. (Block 1994, 514)[Q]ualia in sense modality M (for S) are the way objects phenomenally appear or seem to S in M. (Dretske 1995, 73)‘Qualia’ is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the way things seem to us. (Dennett 1988, 619)…”

Section: Hacker On the ‘What‐it‐is‐like’ Locutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[Q]ualia in sense modality M (for S) are the way objects phenomenally appear or seem to S in M. (Dretske 1995, 73)…”

Section: Hacker On the ‘What‐it‐is‐like’ Locutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defense of the What‐it‐is‐likeness of Experience

Janzen

2011

The Southern J of Philosophy

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It is common parlance among philosophers who inquire into the nature of consciousness to speak of there being something it is like for the subject of a mental state to be in it. The popularity of the 'what-it-is-like' phrase stems, in part, from the assumption that it enables us to distinguish, in an intuitive and illuminating way, between conscious and unconscious mental states: conscious mental states, unlike unconscious mental states, are such that there is something it is like for their subjects to be in them. The 'what-it-is-like' phrase, however, has not gone unopposed; some very clever philosophers have vigorously disputed it. Peter Hacker, for example, argues that the phrase should be abandoned because it is ungrammatical, and Paul Snowdon argues that it should be abandoned because the propositions expressed by its usage are either trivial or false. This paper mounts a case for the claim that neither of these conclusions is warranted. Against Hacker, it is argued that the arguments he produces for the ungrammaticality of the phrase are unpersuasive; and, against Snowdon, it is argued that he fails to consider a plausible and independently motivated interpretation of the phrase and that on this interpretation, the propositions expressed by its usage are nontrivially true.

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Naturalizing The Mind

Cited by 846 publications

References 0 publications

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

Access, phenomenology and sorites

In Defense of the What‐it‐is‐likeness of Experience

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