Nature versus nurture: The simple contrast

Abstract

a b s t r a c tWe respond to the commentary of Franklin, Wright, and Davies (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 102, 239-245 [2009]) by returning to the simple contrast between nature and nurture. We find no evidence from the toddler data that makes us revise our ideas that color categories are learned and never innate.

Language is not necessary for color categories

“…While previous eye-tracking studies with infants have been limited to the blue-green boundary, we also test the blue -purple boundary. Finally, since other researchers have reported failing to replicate the categorical perception of colors in infants (Davidoff et al, 2009), we provide independent evidence to this endeavor. Given the theoretical importance of infant color categories for the debate about the origin of color categories, repeated replication with multiple stimulus sets and category boundaries is desirable.…”

“…Davidoff et al . (; see also Roberson & Hanley, ) also criticize Franklin et al . for having tested infants only for the presence of a single category boundary (the blue–green boundary).…”

“…A second point of criticism has come from Davidoff, Goldstein and Roberson (2009). Although they acknowledge that Franklin and colleagues' (2005) study does not suffer from any of the early faults in the infant color categorization literature, they state that their own attempt to replicate the categorical perception of colors in infants produced no evidence for color categories (see also Gerhardstein, Renner & Rovee-Collier, 1999).…”

“…They report their participants (4-month-olds) found the task uninteresting and became restless and untestable. Davidoff et al (2009; see also Roberson & Hanley, 2009) also criticize Franklin et al for having tested infants only for the presence of a single category boundary (the blue-green boundary). And, in fact, an earlier study by Gerhardstein et al (1999) which tested the red-yellow boundary failed to find categorical perception of color in infants (cf.…”

On contrastive perception and ineffability: assessing sensory experience without colour terms in an Amazonian society

“…However, in the hundreds of articles published by the opponents of Berlin and Kay's theory, it is rare to find any denial of the existence of the notion of colour, or of terms to name colours in all known languages. Indeed, this is the case even for those adopting a so‐called ‘relativistic’ position and openly opposed to universalism, a view which is also flourishing today, particularly in the field of experimental psychology (Davidoff, Goldstein & Roberson ; Özgen & Davies ; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies & Shapiro ; Roberson, Davies & Davidoff ). Research along these lines, which adopts a Whorfian approach, highlights the cultural diversity apparent in how the chromatic colour scale is divided up in terms of linguistic diversity, but does not deny the existence of the notion of colour or of the universal existence of terms to designate colours.…”