Naval Diplomacy—A Theoretical Approach

Abstract

This article considers theoretical aspects of the non-belligerent and political use of naval forces, commonly described as naval diplomacy. It presents four arguments. Firstly, it criticises the often used term "gunboat diplomacy" for being too narrow, emotionally charged, and burdened by colonialism. Secondly, the theories on naval diplomacy are criticised for being better suited for doctrinal purposes than for analytical purposes. Thirdly, criticism is levelled against the term "naval presence," which is deemed insufficient as a focal point in a theory of naval diplomacy. Fourthly, elements of a workable theory of naval diplomacy are presented, including the political aim, naval means, diplomatic method, and geopolitical context. In conclusion, warships and navies are described as symbols of national sovereignty and power, and for having, not only a defence value, but also a symbolic, supportive, and coercive value.

A Friendly Demonstration of Force: Pacific Blockade, International Law and State Identity, 1827 to 1921

“…The incident that related to the British state's identities in so many ways started in 1821, when anti-Turk violence in Southern Greece coincided with Greek expatriate Alexander Ypsilantes starting a rebellion in the Ottoman Empire's Danubian Principalities. 7 Russian agents in Greece had promoted Russian intervention on behalf of their co-religionists since the early eighteenth century, but the only international intervention acceptable in 1820s Europe was that restoring the arrangements of the 1814- [61][62][63][64]. It is worth noting that Russia also had grounds for complaint on the basis of previous treaty terms breached by the Ottoman Empire in putting down Ypsilantes' revolt in the Danubian principalities.…”

“…Canning writes of his certainty of Russia's willingness to use force in relation to the Greek issue and thus the need to avoid running up against Russian intentions, reflecting the danger to the state seen as posed by others in the international environment. 63 He feared Ottoman destruction in favour of a larger Russia to the point of expressing willingness to side with the Ottomans so as to avoid the larger threat of the Russian Empire. 64 Canning frames his potential willingness to join Russia in a Greek intervention as a means of limiting Russian advantage, seeing isolation as dangerous and embarrassing, but he also presumed that any free Greece would be a Russian satellite and thus a danger to Europe's existing balance of power.…”

“…62 In the House of Commons, Philipps raises questions about the intervention's potential for success given the allegedly unconquerable nature of Venezuela's landscape and population, with involvement there thus being a "wild goose expedition." 63 The involvement of Germany, Britain's arch-rival in both popular and diplomatic discussion, only brought more attention to the blockade and its limited to ability to bring Castro to submission as quickly as expected, with some accounts blaming the failure on British subordination to Germany. 64 In contrast, previous blockades had not involved such exposure, with Hogan noting the limited information available on a number of Latin American blockades.…”

“…Its decline perhaps unsurprisingly coincides with attempts to establish a specific, seamless system of 30 Ibid at 352; Ruth Henig, "New Diplomacy and Old: a Reassessment of British Conceptions of a League of Nations, 1918-1920" in Michael Dockrill and John Fisher, eds., The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: peace without victory (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 157 at 163. 31 Supra note 27, Koskenniemi at 49,[62][63][70][71][103][104][105][106]127,[129][130][174][175]307,331,335,[364][365] impartial rules regarding international conduct, outside of custom and self-help. Thus changes in international law as a discipline contribute to the decline of pacific blockade as a doctrine, even if initial efforts to criticize its legitimacy seemingly failed in the 1880s, the systematization of rules cutting out options for states.…”

“…Canningstresses the appearance of an absence of friction with the Russian Empire despite serious suspicions, and Stratford Canning reports that Alexander I recognized British suspicions63 Supra note 1, Temperley at 203.64 Ibid at 346-347; see also Supra note 2, Lane-Poole at 428-429. 65 Supra note 14, Cowles at 697-698, 706-707; Supra note 2, Lane-Poole at 344, 369; Supra note 7, St Clair at 134, 145; Supra note 6, Bitis at 163.…”