Near-efficient equilibria in contribution-based competitive grouping

Gunnthorsdottir, Anna; Vragov, Roumen; Seifert, Stefan; McCabe, Kevin

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.004

Cited by 45 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…As already shown in Gunnthorsdottir et al (2010a), in the case of linear payoff (γ = 1) and homogeneous players the voluntary contribution game with assortative matching has multiple pure strategy Nash Equilibria: one is non contribution by all players and the others are almost Pareto optimal equilibria in which nearly all players contribute their entire endowment and few (less than the group size) contribute nothing. It is easy to see (see "Appendix") that this result actually holds for any value of γ bigger than a threshold valueγ , withγ < 1 and depending on groups size, mpcr and the total number of players.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 69%

“…Predictions may change dramatically, however, when agents are matched 'assortatively' instead, that is, based on their pre-committed choice on how much to contribute so that high (low) contributors are matched with other high (low) contributors. Such mechanisms have been coined 'meritocratic group-based matching' (Gunnthorsdottir et al 2010a), short 'meritocratic matching' (Nax et al 2014). 1 Under meritocratic matching, new equilibria emerge through assortative matching that are as good as near-efficient (Gunnthorsdottir et al 2010a;Nax et al 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such mechanisms have been coined 'meritocratic group-based matching' (Gunnthorsdottir et al 2010a), short 'meritocratic matching' (Nax et al 2014). 1 Under meritocratic matching, new equilibria emerge through assortative matching that are as good as near-efficient (Gunnthorsdottir et al 2010a;Nax et al 2014). Indeed, when better (i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Assortative Matching with Inequality in Voluntary Contribution Games

2017

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Voluntary contribution games are a classic social dilemma in which the individually dominant strategies result in a poor performance of the population. However, the negative zero-contribution predictions from these types of social dilemma situations give way to more positive (near-)efficient ones when assortativity, instead of random mixing, governs the matching process in the population. Under assortative matching, agents contribute more than what would otherwise be strategically rational in order to be matched with others doing likewise. An open question has been the robustness of such predictions when heterogeneity in budgets amongst individuals is allowed. Here, we show analytically that the consequences of permitting heterogeneity depend crucially on the exact nature of the underlying public-good provision efficacy, but generally are rather devastating. Using computational methods, we quantify the loss resulting from heterogeneity vis-a-vis the homogeneous case as a function of (i) the public-good provision efficacy and (ii) the population inequality.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 69%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Assortative Matching with Inequality in Voluntary Contribution Games

2017

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“…Gunnthorsdottir et al (2010) propose the so called "group-based meritocracy mechanism" (GBM) as opposed to "voluntary contribution mechanism" (VCM). GBM matches people according to their contributions in a public provision game and they show that GBM induces higher contributions than VCM in a laboratory setting.…”

Section: State-dependent Assortativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The interplay of cultural intolerance and action-assortativity for the emergence of cooperation and homophily

Bilancini

Boncinelli

2018

European Economic Review

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This paper investigates the emergence of cooperation in a heterogeneous population. The population is divided into two cultural groups. Agents in the population are randomly matched in pairs to engage in a prisoner dilemma. The matching process is assortative, that is, cooperators are more likely to be matched with cooperators, defectors are more likely to be matched with defectors. When two agents of different cultures are matched, they suffer a cost due to their cultural differences. We call such a cost cultural aversion. We find that when cultural aversion is sufficiently strong, perfect correlation between culture and behavior emerges: all agents from one cultural group cooperate, while all agents from the other cultural group defect.JEL classification code: C72; C73; Z10.

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“…They find that subjects who contributed high amounts to the public good were 'chased' by low contributors. Further related works in this direction include Coricelli et al (2004), Cinyabuguma et al (2005), Page et al (2005), and Gunnthorsdottir et al (2010).…”

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confidence: 99%

Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements

Khadjavi

Tjaden

2018

Journal of Public Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Setting the Bar -An Experimental Investigation of Immigration RequirementsMenusch Khadjavi*, Jasper D. Tjaden Abstract: Many Western countries face the challenge of reconciling future labor demand with growing public opposition to immigration. The dynamics and underlying processes of setting immigration requirements remain unclear as research so far mainly focuses on context-specific empirical studies. We use a public good game experiment with endogenous groups to investigate how different levels of perceived migrant potential and public debate shape immigration requirements. We employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. Our results suggest that fairness and efficiency of immigration requirements may best be described by the relationship between average population indicators and required contributions of immigrants. Public debate appears to foster fair and efficient requirements if perceived migrant potential is high.

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Near-efficient equilibria in contribution-based competitive grouping

Cited by 45 publications

References 31 publications

Assortative Matching with Inequality in Voluntary Contribution Games

Assortative Matching with Inequality in Voluntary Contribution Games

The interplay of cultural intolerance and action-assortativity for the emergence of cooperation and homophily

Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements

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