Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision

Sen, Amartya; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(69)90020-9

Cited by 208 publications

(83 citation statements)

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“…Observe that consistency in alternatives is a stronger rationalizability condition than the one proposed by Sen and Pattanaik [14] (property α) which asks that f T (DN ) ∩ S ⊆ f S (DN ).…”

Section: Notation and Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To rule out this possibility, we impose two consistency conditions that describe how the set of preselected alternatives changes as the set of feasible alternatives or the set of voters varies. The condition regarding the set of voters states that individuals who are indifferent between all feasible alternatives do not matter for the final outcome, whereas the one regarding the set of feasible alternatives strengthens the rationalizability condition property α of Sen and Pattanaik [14]. 2 Finally, 1 Among others, further work on set-valued social choice functions is due to Duggan and Schwartz [7], Barberà et.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences

Vorsatz

2006

Soc Choice Welfare

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The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem [11]. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.

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Section: Notation and Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences

Vorsatz

2006

Soc Choice Welfare

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“…11 Horowitz, 1991c, 198, 183, 203; see also Sisk, 1996: 10;Reilly, 1997: 2. 12 Single-peakedness is also known among social choice theorists as Sen's NW condition (Sen and Pattanaik, 1969;Sen, 1970). 13 Single-peaked curves are ones, which are either always upward sloping, or always downward sloping, or always horizontal, or which are upward sloping to a particular point and down ward sloping beyond that point (i.e.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Neo-Downsian Model of the Alternative Vote as a Mechanism for Mitigating Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies

Fraenkel

Grofman

2004

Public Choice

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Among those advocating the use of particular electoralmechanisms to reduce the prospects for conflict and strengthendemocracy in societies that are deeply divided in ethnic orreligious terms, there are two main approaches, one associatedwith Arend Lijphart, one with Donald Horowitz. Lijphartadvocates using electoral rules such as list PR thatstrengthen the power of ethnically or religiously definedpolitical elites in the context of implementing power-sharingmechanisms at the elite level that institutionalize norms suchas proportional allocation and mutual veto across ethnies.Horowitz advocates using a preferential voting method, thealternative vote (AV), within constituencies thatare multi-ethnic in character, to allow for voting acrossethnic lines and to increase the likelihood of electingcandidates whose perceived obligations are wider than theirown ethnic group and/or to foster the creation of coalitionsthat are multi-ethnic in character. The main focus of thisessay is the reformulation of Horowitz’s approach in terms ofideas adapted from the neo-Downsian literature on median votermodels. We illustrate Horowitz’s approach with illustrationsinspired by the predominantly biracial political competitionin Fiji between native Fijians and those of Indian descent. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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“…1 In the field of social choice, broadly conceived, Sen has made many contributions across a wide range of fields. Within the field more narrowly conceived, one can separate out at least three sub-fields where his contribution has been fundamental -the conditions under which majority rule gives rise to an ordering of social states (Sen (1966), see also Sen and Pattanaik (1969)), the conflict between rights and Paretianism (Sen 1970a), and the generalization of the Arrow paradigm to social welfare functionals which is the subject of this essay.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Choice Theory and the Informational Basis Approach

Roberts¹

2009

Amartya Sen

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Abstract:For over a quarter of a century, the use of utility information based upon interpersonal comparisons has been seen as an escape route from the Arrow Impossibility Theorem. This paper critically examines this informational basis approach to social choice. Even with comparability of differences and levels, feasible social choice rules must be insensitive to a range of distributional issues. Also, the Pareto principle is not solely to blame for the inability to adopt rules combining utility and non-utility information: if the Pareto principle is not invoked then there is no way of combining utility and non-utility information in a ranking of states unless levels of utility are comparable; with only level comparability, information must be combined in restrictive ways and the notion of giving different independent weight to different considerations is ruled out. If informational bases are viewed as the restriction on information that is available, rather than a theoretical limit on information, then there exist methods to estimate richer informational structures and overcome some of these difficulties. * The author is grateful to Marc Fleurbaey for his comments.

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Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision

Cited by 208 publications

References 8 publications

Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences

Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences

A Neo-Downsian Model of the Alternative Vote as a Mechanism for Mitigating Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies

Social Choice Theory and the Informational Basis Approach

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