Negative effect of price-matching policy on traditional retailers in a dual-channel supply chain with different content formats

Kittaka, Yuta; Matsushima, Noriaki; Saruta, Fuyuki

doi:10.1016/j.tre.2022.102682

Cited by 13 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 85 publications

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“…Finally, such as Zhen and Xu (2022) endogenizing the retail price in the offline channel and Kittaka et al. (2022) and Tsunoda and Zennyo (2021) endogenizing the commission rate, it is worth endogenizing them in future research.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply chain coordination with financial constraints considering delivery time and cross‐channel spillover effect

Xu,

Yang,

Chen

et al. 2023

Int Trans Operational Res

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A manufacturer selling its products via an offline channel and a capital‐constrained platform is considered in our work. The agency or reseller mode is operated by the platform. Affected by the delivery time, the offline demand is affected by the online channel, which is called the cross‐channel spillover effect (CCSE). Building game models for analysis, we derive the following major results: First, how the commission rate affects the optimal production quantity depends on CCSE. CCSE has no impact on (decreases) the platform's optimal delivery time in the agency (reseller) mode. Besides, the platform's optimal profit decreases with a positive CCSE but increases with a negative CCSE in the agency mode. But in the reseller mode, it always increases with CCSE. Second, the financial constraint decreases the optimal production quantity and extends the optimal delivery time. Third, the agency mode always leads to a larger market share and longer delivery time than the reseller mode. The manufacturer should choose the reseller mode (agency mode) under a high (low) slotting fee. Last, the manufacturer and platform cannot realize coordination by using only the agency or reseller mode. However, considering the manufacturer‐led Stackelberg game, the reseller mode can do so, while the agency mode cannot. Further, considering a retailer and a third party under the omnichannel strategy, the reseller mode can always coordinate them, and the agency mode can only do so at a low interest rate of the loan.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Res. 31 (2024) 1021-1060 Kittaka et al (2022) and Tsunoda and Zennyo (2021) endogenizing the commission rate, it is worth endogenizing them in future research.…”

Section: Appendix Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply chain coordination with financial constraints considering delivery time and cross‐channel spillover effect

Xu,

Yang,

Chen

et al. 2023

Int Trans Operational Res

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“…With the rapid development of e-commerce, more consumers choose online shopping channels [1][2][3][4]. According to the latest report released by Digital Commerce 360, US consumer spending on online shopping reached 982.19 billion dollars in 2022, an increase of 13% from the previous year's 871.03 billion dollars.…”

Section: Introduction 1background and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Manufacturers’ Logistics Strategy Selection in the Context of E-Commerce

Líu

Zhao

2023

Systems

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This paper explores the logistics strategy selection of a manufacturer that uses two sales channels (resale and agency channels) to sell the same product through an E-commerce platform. The agency channel offers two logistic strategies, low-quality logistics services provided by third-party enterprises (Strategy N) and high-quality logistics services provided by the platform (Strategy S). When the manufacturer opts for Strategy S, a portion of the market share of the resale channel shifts to the agency channel, which results in the platform logistics effect. We developed a game-theoretic model to investigate the equilibrium results of a manufacturer under different logistics strategies. The results show that there exists a threshold for the platform logistics effect. When the platform logistics effect is lower than this threshold, the manufacturer prefers Strategy N. Otherwise, the manufacturer prefers Strategy S. However, when the platform logistics price reaches a certain level, the manufacturer will always prefer Strategy N. Our study provides valuable insights for manufacturers and e-commerce platforms to optimize their operational decisions based on different logistics strategies. It also helps manufacturers make rational choices about logistics strategies.

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Optimizing Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chains: An Analysis of Manufacturers’ Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

Xiao,

Kurata

2024

Lecture Notes in Mechanical Engineering

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Negative effect of price-matching policy on traditional retailers in a dual-channel supply chain with different content formats

Cited by 13 publications

References 85 publications

Supply chain coordination with financial constraints considering delivery time and cross‐channel spillover effect

Supply chain coordination with financial constraints considering delivery time and cross‐channel spillover effect

Research on Manufacturers’ Logistics Strategy Selection in the Context of E-Commerce

Optimizing Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chains: An Analysis of Manufacturers’ Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

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