Negotiating history: Contingency, canonicity, and case studies

Abstract

Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories. Methodological objections claim that historical accounts and their uses by philosophers are subject to various biases. We argue that these challenges are not special; they also apply to other epistemic practices. Metaphysical objections, on the other hand, claim that historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence for philosophical claims, even when carefully constructed and used, and so constitute a distinct class of challenge. We show that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address these problems. A case study is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when the features relevant to that aim provide a reasonably complete causal account of the results of the historical process under investigation. We show how to establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using two prominent examples from the history of science: Eddington's confirmation of Einstein's theory of general relativity using his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick's determination of the structure of DNA.

Conceptions of scientific progress in scientific practice: an empirical study

“…5 On the methodological problems associated with using case studies from the history of science as evidence in philosophy of science, see Sauer and Scholl (2016, pp. 1-10), Bolinska and Martin (2020), and Mizrahi (2020). 6 On the application of the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, such as data mining and corpus analysis, to philosophy of science, see Mizrahi (2013b) and Mizrahi (2016).…”

The Case Study Method in Philosophy of Science: An Empirical Study

“…The PhilSci-Archive is "an electronic archive specifically tailored to and run by philosophers of 12 To the best of my knowledge, recent papers that discuss the method of case studies in the Philosophy of Science include the following: Bishop and Trout (2002), Bolinska and Martin (2019), Burian (2001), Chang (2012), Currie (2015), Faust and Meehl (2002), Kinzel (2015), McAllister (2018), Morgan (2012), Pinnick and Gale (2000), Pitt (2001), Steel et al (2017), and the papers collected in Sauer and Scholl (2016).…”

“…According to Bishop and Trout (2002, p. S204), "Contemporary philosophers and historians of science who propose general hypotheses about how science works typically rely on case studies." Likewise, Bolinska and Martin (2019) observe that "philosophers [seek] historical support for their theories [about science]" through the use of case studies. For example, many philosophers have studied the case of Eddington's "measurements of starlight bending in response to the sun's gravitational field," which "validated predictions of Albert Einstein's general theory of relativity" and have deemed it "a clear case from which to draw more general conclusions about the scientific process" (Bolinska and Martin 2019).…”

“…They also identify the problem of "potential for bias," i.e., "Cases are often generated in a manner that does not adequately guard against biases in selection, emphasis, and interpretation." 5 In other words, I am concerned with what Bolinska and Martin (2019) call "problems of method." They argue that methodological objections to the use of case studies as evidence in Philosophy of Science "do not identify special challenges that do not also apply to other epistemic practices."…”

“…This is correct, of course, insofar as, no matter the epistemic domain, inferences of the form "a is an F and a G; therefore, all Fs are Gs" and "a is an F and a G; therefore, most Fs are Gs" are fallacious (with the exception, perhaps, of what Godfrey-Smith 2011 calls inductive inferences "based on causal structures and kinds"; see Mizrahi 2013a for discussion of such inductive inferences in Philosophy of Science, specifically, in the context of the scientific realism/anti-realism debate). Nevertheless, Bolinska and Martin (2019) think that "attention to the ways in which history is messy and in which philosophy is difficult can be resources for developing better historiographical and philosophical practices" (emphasis in original). other uses of cases studies (e.g., pedagogical) except as evidence for and/or against theories about science in Philosophy of Science.…”