Negotiating under Political Uncertainty: National Elections and the Dynamics of International Co-operation

Abstract

This article explores if and how national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature on about the informational efficiency of elections, we are interested in how political uncertainty in the run up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case of decision-making in the European Union (EU), we find that pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of reaching an agreement at the international level, that this effect is strongest during close elections with uncertain outcomes, and that it is particularly pronounced in the case of elections in larger member states. Our findings highlight the fruitfulness of further research into the dynamics between national and international politics. The article has positive and normative implications for the literature on two-level games, international negotiations, and legislative bargaining in the EU.

Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21st‐century Europe

“…By contrast, when non‐salient issues are on the table, especially symbolic or diffuse matters such as constitutional reform and membership, the optimal strategy of politicians is collectively to say one thing and do another – that is, to engage in ‘organized hypocrisy’ (Krasner, ). Since symbolic issues rarely generate sustained public pressure, particularly with regard to concrete issues, politicians have an incentive to stall until after elections, engage in rhetorical spin, take cheap symbolic actions, or make formalistic changes – while avoiding costly major substantive policy shifts away from integration (Kleine and Minaudier, ). De Gaulle did just this in the 1960s (Moravcsik, , pp.…”

When politics prevails: Parties, elections and loyalty in the European Parliament

“…Recent studies also demonstrate that national parties’ issue salience impacts on MEPs’ voting behaviour (Klüver & Spoon ; Costello & Thomson ). However, the impact of national elections on the EU's actors, negotiations and decision making has been surprisingly under‐explored (but see Schneider () and Kleine & Minaudier () on intergovernmental negotiations). By drawing on European and national electoral politics to explain delegations’ (dis)loyalty, we thus add a multilevel dimension to the fast‐developing scholarship on how European elections impact on voting behaviour in the EP, and on how national elections affect voting unity in the domestic democratic arena.…”

Modes of government responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council negotiation positions

“…I argue that domestic electoral competition is key for understanding responsiveness in the Council, as governments' accountability to voters at home provides the central incentives for them to respond to public opinion. The existing findings of responsiveness at the EU level (Bølstad, 2015;Hagemann et al, 2017;Toshkov, 2011) and national electoral cycle effects in Council decision-making (Kleine and Minaudier, 2017;Schneider, 2013) strongly suggest that governments consider their accountability in national elections when acting at the EU level. Considerations of electoral accountability should incentivize governments to be responsive to public opinion to forestall and avoid future electoral sanctions at the next election.…”

“…Theoretically, I start from the idea that when negotiating legislation in Brussels, governments also consider their accountability to domestic voters (Kleine and Minaudier, 2017;Schneider, 2013). Whereas these voters reliably care about leftright issues in domestic elections (van der Brug et al, 2008;van der Eijk et al, 2005), their interest in pro-anti integration issues is much more variable over time Stevens, 2013).…”