Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: A coopetitive-game analysis

Zhong, Feimin; Zhou, Zhongbao; Leng, Mingming

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2021.02.020

Cited by 16 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Using backward induction, it can be found that under the 15 we have the respective equilibrium results of Models E and I as Table 5, where The profit allocation between two firms in a supply chain is determined by the agreed price that the downstream firm pays to the upstream firm (Zhong, Zhou, & Leng, 2021). It is surprising to notice that although the EER and the EIR legislations can lead to different profit allocations between the firms, the market demand, consumer surplus as well as social welfare are always the same.…”

Section: Equilibrium Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk management for second‐hand clothing imports in least developed countries: Legislations and perception of public‐sector corruption

Guo

Choi

2023

Risk Analysis

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The second‐hand clothing imports are very popular in the least developed countries (LDCs). The social health risk (SHR) associated with second‐hand clothing products and the lack of relevant legislations in LDCs, however, bring substantial challenges. This article is therefore developed to explore the sterilization legislation design for second‐hand clothing supply chains in LDCs. To address LDCs’ different import requirements of fumigation, both the extended exporter responsibility (EER) legislation scheme and the extended importer responsibility (EIR) legislation scheme are considered. We also examine whether the perception of public‐sector corruption in LDCs may affect the performance of sterilization legislation schemes. We compare the performance of sterilization legislation schemes under different public‐sector corruption cases, different sterilization legislation structures, as well as market competition. Interestingly, our analyses show that the EER and EIR legislation schemes can achieve the same performance under a per unit SHR duty, no matter whether there is public‐sector corruption or not. However, these two legislation schemes perform differently under the lump‐sum SHR duty. Besides, with the presence of the public‐sector corruption perception, the prospect of financial benefits from bribing the regulatory agency can induce the firm to choose a higher optimal sterilization level when the bribe is sufficiently small. These implications complement the extant knowledge on risk management of second‐hand clothing in LDCs, and provide an important guidance regarding the design of sterilization legislations on second‐hand clothing imports.

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Section: Equilibrium Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk management for second‐hand clothing imports in least developed countries: Legislations and perception of public‐sector corruption

Guo

Choi

2023

Risk Analysis

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“…Matsui (2020) explores the optimal timing of when a manufacturer should bargain a wholesale price with a retailer in a dual-channel supply chain that consists of the manufacturer and the retailer. Zhong et al (2021) build a Nash bargaining model to investigate a three-echelon supply chain in which a distributor at the middle echelon negotiates two wholesale price contracts with his upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zhong et al. (2021) build a Nash bargaining model to investigate a three‐echelon supply chain in which a distributor at the middle echelon negotiates two wholesale price contracts with his upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead of modeling the external constituents of bargaining power, we take it to be an exogenously parameter. Such an asymmetric modeling framework captures the various cases where the supplier and the customer can have different bargaining powers due to their diverse backgrounds (Feng and Lu, 2012; Aydin and Heese, 2015; Matsui, 2020; Zhong et al., 2021).…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Negotiation for service contracting: incentives, bargaining power, and customer risk aversion

2022

Int Trans Operational Res

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In this paper, we analyze negotiation of service contracts when an equipment user (customer) outsources product failure repair service to an MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) supplier. The customer is risk averse due to serious consequences of system disruption. The two parties negotiate pricing terms and repair rate. We model the bilateral negotiations under three types of service contract: (i) fixed‐fee contract under which the customer pays a lump sum, (ii) pay‐per‐repair contract under which the customer pays for each repair incident, and (iii) uptime‐based contract under which the customer pays for product uptime. We investigate how different incentives under each contract interact with agents' bargaining power and customer risk aversion in the negotiation process, both theoretically and numerically. Despite that previous studies have shown that fixed‐fee contract generally does not provide incentives for suppliers to invest in repair capacity while uptime‐based contract does, we find that under a bargaining framework fixed‐fee contract can result in the highest (yet suboptimal) repair rate. Furthermore, consensus on contract types may not be achieved between the two parties. For the supplier, uptime‐based contract can result in the highest payoff while pay‐per‐repair contract leads to the lowest. For the customer, it may prefer to choose pay‐per‐repair contract when it is less risk averse and when the supplier has more bargaining power. Our results show some unexplored merits of other types of contracts when the advantages of uptime‐based contract have been highly cited.

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“…Sun et al [17] established the best price, replenishment quantity, and time for seasonal and nonseasonal products in a three-stage supply chain, including a retailer, a sharing platform, and two competitive factories. Zhong et al studied the negotiation order, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain based on competitive games [18]. In [19], the Stackelberg game method was used to establish the order decision model under emission reduction, and a sustainable coordination scheme for a revenue-sharing contract is provided.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Simulation-Based Study on the Optimal Pricing Strategy of Supply Chain System

Li,

Wang

2023

Sustainability

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In this paper, the utility function model is applied to study the pricing strategy and order/production strategy of a two-echelon supply chain. Through local point-to-point communication between multi-agents and considering the random communication delay of the system, the utility function is maximized based on the consistency theory, and the optimal price and order quantity are determined. The proposed algorithm is distributed and collaborative, which avoids the centralized demand for all node information and the drawbacks of system paralysis caused by node failure. In addition, we carried out a numerical simulation to verify the theoretical results and demonstrate the effectiveness of the multi-agent consensus theory in the stable operation of supply and demand within a supply chain when there is a random communication delay and the sudden failure of a supply chain enterprise. It further explains how the coefficient of consumer sensitivity to price affects pricing and order/production strategies.

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Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: A coopetitive-game analysis

Cited by 16 publications

References 31 publications

Risk management for second‐hand clothing imports in least developed countries: Legislations and perception of public‐sector corruption

Risk management for second‐hand clothing imports in least developed countries: Legislations and perception of public‐sector corruption

Negotiation for service contracting: incentives, bargaining power, and customer risk aversion

A Simulation-Based Study on the Optimal Pricing Strategy of Supply Chain System

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