Neural Basis of Fear Conditioning

Considering PTSD from the perspective of brain processes: A psychological construction approach

“…This interpretation is consistent with recent findings that the amygdala is part of an intrinsic brain network that helps to determine the personal or motivational salience of an object or event (Menon & Uddin, 2010; Seeley et al, 2007; Sridharan et al, 2008), a process that is often, but not always, associated with fear. Neutral stimuli might not acquire fear‐eliciting properties in PTSD (Bush, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2009; Keane, Zimering, & Caddell, 1985; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006), but might instead be coded as inherently uncertain and of unrelenting personal relevance. The result could be an abnormally autonomic reactivity (associated with hyperarousal), which then the perceiver must make meaningful in some way (perhaps via mentalizing with the reactivation of prior experience).…”

Social Neuroscience and the Modern Synthesis of Social and Biological Levels of Analysis

“…It is now clear that nearly all rewarding stimuli or positive hedonic states are associated with dopamine release in the nACC, and lesions or blockade of dopamine receptors in the nACC reduces rewards and positive hedonics (Hoebel et al 1999 ;Robinson and Berridge 2003 ;Wise 2006 ). In this regard, the nACC contrasts with the amygdala, which has generally been implicated in fear conditioning, negative affect, and aversive states (see Bush et al 2009 ), a topic to which we will return below.…”

Wide Externalism and the Roles of Biology and Culture in Human Emotional Development

“…The first is that whatever core realiser is identified in any total realiser system, it is still only a partial realiser (Shoemaker, 1984) because it must receive, at the very least, some excitatory sensory-perceptual input. The amygdala, for instance, is activated by sensory input from thalamus and cortex and, without this input, there would be no amygdala activation (Bush et al, 2009). The second point worth emphasising is that, irrespective of conceptual disposition, core realisers are considered to provide the necessary conditions for emotionality.…”

“…Relatedly, they also disagree on the extent to which emotions are genetically hard-wired and/or culturally/socially constructed. Theorists who opine the former tend to do so because there is at least some evidence of universal emotion elicitors and expressions and because there is increasing evidence of specific neural substrata for at least some emotions, for example, fear (Bush, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2009). Social constructionists, in contrast, deny the existence of universal emotions and, therefore, genetic hard-wiring.…”