Neural correlates of action attribution in schizophrenia

Farrer, Chlöé; Franck, Nicolás; Frith, C. D.; Decety, Jean; Guillaume, Nicolas; d’Amato, Thierry; Jeannerod, Marc

doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2004.02.004

Cited by 167 publications

(127 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…In support of this view, a recent fMRI study showed that the posterior insula is a key area for coding ownership for one's hands [115]. The TPJ/insula has also been involved in the self-attribution of seen movements and agency [48,49] and first-person-perspective taking [119]. We wonder why there is a different involvement of right and left TPJ in autoscopic phenomena as there is evidence that out-of-body experiences are more frequent after damage to the right TPJ causing stronger and distinct abnormalities in body ownership and embodiment than heautoscopy.…”

Section: Linking Abnormal Body Ownership and Embodiment At The Multismentioning

confidence: 94%

Body ownership and embodiment: Vestibular and multisensory mechanisms

Lopez

Halje

Blanke

2008

Neurophysiologie Clinique/Clinical Neurophysiology

236

163

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Summary Body ownership and embodiment are two fundamental mechanisms of selfconsciousness. The present article reviews neurological data about paroxysmal illusions during which body ownership and embodiment are affected differentially: autoscopic phenomena (out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, autoscopic hallucination, feeling-of-a-presence) and the room tilt illusion. We suggest that autoscopic phenomena and room tilt illusion are related to different types of failures to integrate body-related information (vestibular, proprioceptive and tactile cues) in addition to a mismatch between vestibular and visual references. In these patients, altered body ownership and embodiment has been shown to occur due to pathological activity at the temporoparietal junction and other vestibular-related areas arguing for a key importance of vestibular processing. We also review the possibilities of manipulating body ownership and embodiment in healthy subjects through exposition to weightlessness as well as caloric and galvanic stimulation of the peripheral vestibular apparatus. In healthy subjects, disturbed self-processing might be related to interference of vestibular stimulation with vestibular cortex leading to disintegration of bodily information and altered body ownership and embodiment. We finally propose a differential contribution of the vestibular cortical areas to the different forms of altered body ownership and embodiment. Résumé L'attribution du corps propre et de ses éléments constitutifs (body ownership), ainsi que le sentiment d'incarnation (embodiment) -le fait d'habiter ce corps, d'être localisé dans les limites physiques de ce corps -, sont deux éléments fondamentaux de la conscience de soi. Nous faisons ici la synthèse de données issues de la neurologie montrant que des manifestations paroxystiques telles que les phénomènes autoscopiques (expérience de sortie du corps, héautoscopie, hallucination autoscopique, sensation de présence) et l'illusion de bascule de l'environnement (room tilt illusion) se caractérisent par une atteinte différentielle des mécanismes d'attribution du corps propre et du sentiment d'incarnation. Nous faisons l'hypothèse que les différents phénomènes autoscopiques et l'illusion de bascule de l'environnement se caractérisent par différents patrons de déficits d'intégration des informations sensorielles corporelles (informations visuelles, musculaires proprioceptives et tactiles) combinés à une perte de cohérence entre les références visuelles et vestibulaires. Chez les patients souffrant de phénomènes autoscopiques, les déficits d'attribution du corps propre et du sentiment d'incarnation ont été liés à un dysfonctionnement au niveau de la jonction temporopariétale et d'autres régions corticales recevant des informations vestibulaires, suggérant une contribution importante des afférences vestibulaires dans les mécanismes de la conscience de soi. Nous rapportons également des données de la littérature recueillies chez des sujets sains suggérant la possibilité de manipuler l'attribution ...

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Section: Linking Abnormal Body Ownership and Embodiment At The Multismentioning

confidence: 94%

Body ownership and embodiment: Vestibular and multisensory mechanisms

Lopez

Halje

Blanke

2008

Neurophysiologie Clinique/Clinical Neurophysiology

236

163

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…By contrast, in schizophrenia, a hypo-activation in several brain regions, especially in the left inferior frontal gyrus (Russell, et al, 2000) and right posterior orbital cortex (Brunet et al, 2003) during the performance of the Eyes-test has been shown. Regarding the sense of agency, an abnormal hyper-activation of the IPL, the brain area critical for distinguishing internally produced actions from those generated by others (Decety et al, 2002, Farrer et al, 2004, Decety and Lamm, 2006, Schnell et al, 2007 has been found in schizophrenia, especially in patients with firstrank symptoms (Spence et al, 1997, Farrer, et al, 2004. Regarding the interaction between the sense of agency and mentalizing, it has been speculated that, since schizophrenia patients show impairments in both processes on a physiological level, the functional connectivity between the IPL and prefrontal areas, may also be impaired (Frith et al, 2000).…”

Section: The Relationship Between Mentalizing and Sense Of Agency In mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, our agency task was based on previously used paradigms (e.g. also manipulating visual feedback on a computer screen) and can be considered a reliable indicator of sense of agency processes (Fourneret, et al, 2001, Farrer, et al, 2004. It could even be traced back to the seminal work conducted by Nielsen (Nielsen, 1963), who had subjects draw a line on a piece of paper.…”

Section: Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sense of agency and mentalizing: Dissociation of subdomains of social cognition in patients with schizophrenia

Schimansky

David

Rössler

et al. 2010

Psychiatry Research

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The sense of agency, i.e., the sense that "I am the one who is causing an action", and mentalizing, the ability to understand the mental states of other individuals, are key domains of social cognition. It has been hypothesized that an intact sense of agency is an important precondition for higher-level mentalizing abilities. A substantial body of evidence shows that both processes rely on similar brain areas and are severely impaired in schizophrenia, suggesting a close link between agency and mentalizing. Yet this relationship has not been explicitly tested. We investigated 40 individuals with schizophrenia and 40 healthy controls on an agency and mentalizing task. On the agency task, participants carried out simple mouse movements and judged the partially manipulated visual feedback as either self-or other-generated. On the mentalizing task, participants inferred mental states from pictures that depicted others' eyes ("Reading the mind in the eyes test"). Neuropsychological, psychopathological and social functioning levels were also evaluated. Both sense of agency and mentalizing were impaired in schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls. However, testing for a relationship revealed no significant correlations between the two processes, either in the schizophrenia or the control group. The present findings demonstrate a dissociation of agency and mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia, suggesting that the multifaceted construct of social cognition consists of independent subdomains in healthy and psychiatrically ill individuals. AbstractThe sense of agency, i.e., the sense that "I am the one who is causing an action", and mentalizing, the ability to understand the mental states of other individuals, are key domains of social cognition. It has been hypothesized that an intact sense of agency is an important precondition for higher-level mentalizing abilities. A substantial body of evidence shows that both processes rely on similar brain areas and are severely impaired in schizophrenia, suggesting a close link between agency andmentalizing. Yet this relationship has not been explicitly tested. We investigated 40 individuals with schizophrenia and 40 healthy controls on an agency and mentalizing task. On the agency task, participants carried out simple mouse movements and judged the partially manipulated visual feedback as either self or other generated. On the mentalizing task, participants inferred mental states from pictures that depicted others' eyes ("Reading the Mind in the Eyes test"). Neuropsychological, psychopathological and social functioning levels were also evaluated.Both sense of agency and mentalizing were impaired in schizophrenics compared to healthy controls.However, testing for a relationship revealed no significant correlations between the two processes, either in the schizophrenia or the control group.The present findings demonstrate a dissociation of agency and mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia,suggesting that the multifaceted construct of social cognition consists of independ...

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“…Based on the previously described neurologic data, we also expected to find multisensory and vestibular deficits specifically related to positive psychotic or schizotypal symptoms and/or to the TPJ. Unfortunately, reports on multisensory integration in schizophrenia (see [40] for review), particularly multisensory integration of bodily information, are relatively sparse (see [41,42] for reviews). In the study by Spence et al [41], patients showing passivity symptoms (such as loss of agency and/or alien control) were asked to move a joystick with the right hand to the sound of auditory stimuli.…”

Section: Psychosismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Compared with normal control subjects and patients without passivity symptoms, this patient population showed a hyperactivation of right inferior parietal lobule and cingulate gyrus. Farrer et al [42] tested action attribution in patients with Schneiderian first-rank symptoms. The task required self-other decisions about seen hand movements on a computer screen.…”

Section: Psychosismentioning

confidence: 99%