Various theories in neuroscience maintain that brain oscillations have an important role in neuronal computation, but opposing views claim that these macroscale dynamics are “exhaust fumes” of more relevant processes. Here, we argue that the question of whether oscillations are epiphenomenal is ill-defined and cannot be productively resolved without further refinement. Toward that end, we outline a conceptual framework that clarifies the dispute along two axes: first, we introduce a distinction between measurement and process to categorize the theoretical status of electrophysiology terms such as local field potentials and oscillations. Second, we consider the relationships between these disambiguated terms, evaluating based on experimental and computational evidence whether there exist causal or inferentially useful links between them. This decomposes the question of epiphenomenalism into a set of empirically tractable alternatives. Finally, we demarcate oscillations as a conceptually distinct entity where either processes or measurements exhibit periodic behavior, and we suggest that oscillatory processes orchestrate neural computation by implementing a temporal, spatial, and frequency syntax. Overall, our reframed evaluation supports the view that electric fields—oscillating or not—are causally relevant, and that their associated signals are informative. More broadly, we offer a vocabulary and starting point for scientific exchanges on the role and utility of brain signals and the biological processes they capture.