Neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness

Critchley, Hugo; Wiens, Stefan; Rotshtein, Pia; Öhman, Annelie Bränström; Dolan, Raymond J.

doi:10.1038/nn1176

Cited by 2,984 publications

(2,647 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Emotionintrospection activated more posteriorly bilateral inferior frontal/premotor regions and also minor parts of the middle insula. This was not fully in line with findings of activity in the relatively more anterior VLPFC during affect labeling in states of mindfulness (Brefczynski-Lewis et al, 2007;Creswell et al, 2007;Farb et al, 2007;Lieberman et al, 2007;Stein et al, 2008) but in part with interoception associated activity in the insula (Critchley et al, 2004).…”

Section: Self-referencementioning

confidence: 68%

Self-related awareness and emotion regulation

et al. 2010

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The regulation of emotions is an ongoing internal process and often a challenge. Current related neural models concern the intended control of reactions towards external events, mediated by prefrontal cortex regions upon basal emotion processing as in the amygdala. Cognitive strategies to regulate emotions in the context of affective disorders or stress reduction, increasingly applied in clinical practice, are also related to mindfulness techniques. We questioned their effects on neural emotion processing and investigated brain activity during purely internal mental self-referential processes of making current emotions and self-related cognitions aware. Thirty healthy subjects performed a task comprising periods of cognitive self-reflection, of introspection for actual own emotions and feelings, and of a neutral condition, while they were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Brain activations of twenty-seven subjects during emotion-introspection and self-reflection, and also a conjunction of both, were compared with the neutral condition. The conditions of self-reflection and emotion-introspection showed distinguishable activations in medial and ventrolateral prefrontal areas, in parietal regions and in the amygdala. Notably, amygdala activity decreased during emotion-introspection and increased compared to 'neutral' during self-reflection. The results indicate that already the self-referential mental state of making the actual emotional state aware is capable of attenuating emotional arousal. This extends current theories of emotion regulation and has implications for the application of mindfulness techniques as a component of psychotherapeutic strategies in affective disorders and also for possible everyday emotion regulation. AbstractThe regulation of emotions is an ongoing internal process and often a challenge. Current related neural models concern the intended control of reactions towards external events, mediated by prefrontal cortex regions upon basal emotion processing as in the amygdala. Cognitive strategies to regulate emotions in the context of affective disorders or stress reduction, increasingly applied in clinical practice, are also related to mindfulness techniques. We questioned their effects on neural emotion processing and investigated brain activity during purely internal mental selfreferential processes of making current emotions and self-related cognitions aware. Thirty healthy subjects performed a task comprising periods of cognitive self-reflection, of introspection for actual own emotions and feelings, and of a neutral condition, while they were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Brain activations of twenty-seven subjects during emotion-introspection and self-reflection, and also a conjunction of both, were compared with the neutral condition. The conditions of self-reflection and emotion-introspection showed distinguishable activations in medial and ventrolateral prefrontal areas, in parietal regions and in the amygdala. Notably, amygdala activ...

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Section: Self-referencementioning

confidence: 68%

Self-related awareness and emotion regulation

et al. 2010

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“…The assessment of interoceptive accuracy (IA), therefore, requires the monitoring of physical changes, which can be readily measured. The heartbeat tracking task is a useful assessment paradigm, as heartbeats are easily quantifiable as discrete and determinable stimuli (13)(14)(15). Numerous studies have used this paradigm to assess IA in panic patients in order to investigate hypervigilance towards bodily sensations (16)(17)(18)(19)(20).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generalized hypervigilance in fibromyalgia: Normal interoceptive accuracy, but reduced self-regulatory capacity

Rost

Ryckeghem

Schulz

et al. 2017

Journal of Psychosomatic Research

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Objective: The factors underlying the aetiology of fibromyalgia (FM) are largely unknown.According to the generalized hypervigilance hypothesis (GHH), FM patients show excessive attention towards pain stimuli and other sensory events, thereby increasing pain perception and dysfunctional behaviour. We tested this notion by assessing interoceptive accuracy (IA) in FM patients and matched healthy controls. We also tested the hypothesis that FM is characterized by reduced self-regulatory capacity as indexed by heart rate variability (HRV).Methods: 47 FM patients (Mage = 45.5, 39 females) and 45 healthy controls (Mage = 44.9, 37 females) completed several self-report scales (Body Vigilance Scale, Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, Pain Catastrophizing Scale). To derive HRV, heart rate was monitored under resting conditions; for the assessment of IA participants performed a heartbeat tracking task in which they were asked to silently count their heartbeats. Results: FM patients reported higher body vigilance than healthy controls, but there were no group differences in IA. FM patients had lower HRV compared with healthy controls. HRV did not predictor IA. Conclusion: In conclusion, our findings do not support the hypothesis of generalized hypervigilance in FM patients. Patients reported a heightened focus on bodily sensations, which was not reflected in IA. It may be that hypervigilance is not a general and stable characteristic but is rather context dependent and modality-specific.

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“…Moreover, the insular cortex has been recently discussed in the context of interoception, a concept that refers to the feelings that we perceive from our bodies (Craig 2002, 2009; Critchley et al. 2004). According to Craig (2002), it is the “sense of the physiological condition of the body” (p. 655).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also expected activation within the anterior insula, which has been shown to correlate with levels of non‐conscious interoceptive awareness, that is, the ability to perceive afferent information, an ability believed to contribute to the intuitive apprehension of meaning (Critchley et al. 2004; Craig 2009). According to Bowers et al.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intuitive decision making as a gradual process: investigating semantic intuition‐based and priming‐based decisions with fMRI

2015

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IntroductionIntuition has been defined as the instantaneous, experience‐based impression of coherence elicited by cues in the environment. In a context of discovery, intuitive decision‐making processes can be conceptualized as occurring within two stages, the first of which comprises an implicit perception of coherence that is not (yet) verbalizable. Through a process of spreading activation, this initially non‐conscious perception gradually crosses over a threshold of awareness and thereby becomes explicable. Because of its experiential basis, intuition shares conceptual similarities with implicit memory processes. Based on these, the study addresses two research questions: (1) Is the gradual nature of intuitive processes reflected on a neural level? (2) Do intuition‐based decisions differ neurally from priming‐based decisions?MethodsTo answer these questions, we conducted an fMRI study using the triads task and presented participants with coherent word triads that converge on a common fourth concept, and incoherent word triads that do not converge on a common fourth concept. Participants had to perform semantic coherence judgments as well as to indicate whether they immediately knew the fourth concept. To enable investigating intuition‐based and priming‐based decisions within the same task and with the same participants, we implemented a conceptual priming procedure into the coherence judgment task. We realized this by priming participants with concepts associated with incoherent triads in separate priming blocks prior to the coherence judgments.ResultsFor intuition‐based decisions, imaging results mainly revealed activity within the orbitofrontal cortex, within the inferior frontal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus. Activity suppression in the right temporo‐occipital complex was observed for priming‐based decisions.ConclusionsWith respect to research question 1, our data support a continuity model of intuition because the two intuitive stages show quantitatively distinct brain activation patterns. Regarding research question 2, we can draw the preliminary conclusion of a qualitative difference between intuition‐based and priming‐based decisions.

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Neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness

Cited by 2,984 publications

References 38 publications

Self-related awareness and emotion regulation

Self-related awareness and emotion regulation

Generalized hypervigilance in fibromyalgia: Normal interoceptive accuracy, but reduced self-regulatory capacity

Intuitive decision making as a gradual process: investigating semantic intuition‐based and priming‐based decisions with fMRI

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