New Arguments that Philosophers don't Treat Intuitions as Evidence

Molyneux, Bernard

doi:10.1111/meta.12094

Cited by 13 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Cf. Molyneux (2014). 8 Molyneux (2014, p. 441) distinguishes between "descriptive evidentialism," which is the view that intuitions are treated as evidence in Analytic Philosophy, and "normative evidentialism," which is the view that intuitions should be treated as evidence in Analytic Philosophy.…”

Section: The Heart Of Analytic Philosophy Is Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!

Mizrahi

2021

Axiomathes

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In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by professional analytic philosophers be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. Since intuitions are not public (or transparent) evidence, it follows that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments for and/or against philosophical theses because they lack the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers.

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Section: The Heart Of Analytic Philosophy Is Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!

Mizrahi

2021

Axiomathes

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“…Other examples of arguments in this vein include Deutsch (2009Deutsch ( , 2010Deutsch ( , 2015; Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009); Ichikawa (2014); Molyneux (2014).…”

Section: Existing Work On How Experimental Philosophy Can Contribute ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fully experimental conceptual engineering

Andow

2020

Inquiry

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Conceptual engineers are in the business of helping us think as we should. Experimental philosophy can be seen as being in the business of describing how we think.One might think there must thus be a gap between any experimental philosophy project and any successful project in conceptual engineering, that conceptual engineering reserves a special role for armchair philosophers. But, a successful project in conceptual engineering might be fully experimental. Conceptual engineering reserves no special role for armchair philosophers.

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“…8. If we take such intuitions to count as evidence for or against particular accounts of a concept, then conceptual analysis in the analytic-philosophical tradition is perhaps in some sense “lightly” empirical, though differing views about the evidential status of intuitions have incited a lively debate among philosophers concerning the veracity of just this sort of claim (see, e.g. Clarke, 2013; Climenhaga, 2018; Molyneux, 2014; Ramsay, 2019). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The trouble with diverse books, part I: on the limits of conceptual analysis for political negotiation in Library & Information Science

Lawrence

2020

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PurposeThe term diverse books is increasingly popular yet persistently nebulous. The purpose of this paper – Part I of II – is to illuminate both that the concept is in need of a unified account and that conceptual analysis, though at first seemingly quite promising, fails as a method for identifying one.Design/methodology/approachThis paper utilizes traditional (or intuitive) conceptual analysis to specify the respective clusters of necessary and sufficient conditions that constitute four broad candidate accounts of diverse books.FindingsThough diverse books is a concept in need of a definition, conceptual analysis is not an appropriate method for adjudicating between the definitions we have on offer. This is because the concept is fundamentally political, serving as a resource for re-shaping collective social arrangements and ways of life. The conceptual problem outlined here requires for its resolution a method that will move us from a descriptive project to an explicitly normative one, wherein we consider what we properly work to achieve with and through the concept in question.Originality/valueThis paper initiates a systematic analytical project aimed at defining diverse books. In illustrating a moment of methodological failure, it paves the way for a critical alternative – namely, Part II's proposal of an analytical intervention in which political concepts are defined partially in terms of their benefits vis-á-vis informational justice.

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New Arguments that Philosophers don't Treat Intuitions as Evidence

Cited by 13 publications

References 49 publications

Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!

Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!

Fully experimental conceptual engineering

The trouble with diverse books, part I: on the limits of conceptual analysis for political negotiation in Library & Information Science

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