New Mechanistic Explanation and the Need for Explanatory Constraints

Franklin-Hall, Laura

doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_2

Cited by 32 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Mechanistic approaches have been extraordinarily influential in recent philosophy of science, in part because they are framed as an alternative to traditional reductionist programs (Andersen 2014; Craver 2007; Fehr 2004). While many “New Mechanists” (Levy 2013; Franklin-Hall 2016) reject traditional reductionism and stress the importance of components across multiple levels of organization, they still focus on explanatory strategies that can be plausibly contrasted with holistic perspectives in TEK. Most importantly, mechanistic approaches involve decompositional analyses of “parts whose activities and interactions are responsible for the phenomena” (Illari and Glennan 2017: 1).…”

Section: Identifying and Managing Mechanisms With Tekmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relating traditional and academic ecological knowledge: mechanistic and holistic epistemologies across cultures

Ludwig

Poliseli

2018

Biol Philos

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Current debates about the integration of traditional and academic ecological knowledge (TEK and AEK) struggle with a dilemma of division and assimilation. On the one hand, the emphasis on differences between traditional and academic perspectives has been criticized as creating an artificial divide that brands TEK as “non-scientific” and contributes to its marginalization. On the other hand, there has been increased concern about inadequate assimilation of Indigenous and other traditional perspectives into scientific practices that disregards the holistic nature and values of TEK. The aim of this article is to develop a practice-based account of the epistemic relations between TEK and AEK that avoids both horns of the dilemma. While relations between TEK and AEK are often described in terms of the “holistic” nature of the former and the “mechanistic” character of the latter, we argue that a simple holism–mechanism divide misrepresents the epistemic resources of both TEK and AEK. Based on the literature on mechanistic explanations in philosophy of science, we argue that holders of TEK are perfectly capable of identifying mechanisms that underlie ecological phenomena while AEK often relies on non-mechanistic strategies of dealing with ecological complexity. Instead of generic characterizations of knowledge systems as either mechanistic or holistic, we propose to approach epistemic relations between knowledge systems by analyzing their (partly mechanistic and partly holistic) heuristics in practice.

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Section: Identifying and Managing Mechanisms With Tekmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relating traditional and academic ecological knowledge: mechanistic and holistic epistemologies across cultures

Ludwig

Poliseli

2018

Biol Philos

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“… 6. It is for this reason that we do not believe PC selection represents a carving error (Franklin-Hall, 2016). …”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

Phenomena complexes as targets of explanation in psychopathology: The relational analysis of phenomena approach

Nielsen

Ward

2020

Theory & Psychology

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In this article, we briefly overview some current approaches to identifying targets of explanation in psychopathology. We suggest that DSM syndromes and symptom network models are too large to facilitate explanatory progress, while approaches couched in the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) are too tightly focused, thereby overlooking the self-maintaining structures and processes that constitute mental disorders. We then present the Relational Analysis of Phenomena (RAP) as a complementary method. The RAP is a metamethodological explanatory framework that prescribes the repeated targeting of “phenomena complexes” (PCs). PCs are small systems of clinical phenomena and their relations. We describe a process by which PCs are targeted, richly described, and then explained. The RAP’s explanatory focus is on the relationships between clinical phenomena, which should help to reveal the constitutional structure of mental disorders. This framework is designed to be useful for theoreticians, research teams planning multidisciplinary investigatory projects, and clinicians reflecting on their explanatory methods.

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“…It is for this reason that I do not believe that PC selection represents a carving error(Franklin- Hall, 2016) …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What is Mental Disorder? Developing an Embodied, Embedded, and Enactive Psychopathology

Nielsen¹

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<p>What we take mental disorder to be has implications for how researchers classify, explain, and treat mental disorders. It also shapes how the public treat those who are experiencing mental disorder. This is the often-underemphasized task of conceptualization, which sits at the foundation of psychopathology research. In this thesis I consider the nature of mental disorder through the lens of a growing perspective known as embodied enactivism. Embodied enactivism is a philosophical position on human functioning that holds the mind to be: embodied (non-cartesian, and constituted by both brain and body), embedded (richly influenced by the physical and social environment across development), and enactive (meaning and experience arise through the precarious organisms’ interactions with the world). After overviewing a selection of current conceptual positions – present either as independent conceptual frameworks or within our classification systems – I move to presenting my own conceptual framework of mental disorder grounded in an embodied, embedded, and enactive view. Some implications of this framework for the task of classification are explored, and a meta-methodological framework for developing explanations of psychopathology is developed. It is shown that the concept of mental disorder developed: moves beyond the internalist bias of many current concepts, recognizes the normative nature of disorder, encourages consideration of cultural and individual variance, does not unduly prioritize brain-level explanations of human behaviour, and can sit comfortably within a wholly natural world view.</p>

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New Mechanistic Explanation and the Need for Explanatory Constraints

Cited by 32 publications

References 35 publications

Relating traditional and academic ecological knowledge: mechanistic and holistic epistemologies across cultures

Relating traditional and academic ecological knowledge: mechanistic and holistic epistemologies across cultures

Phenomena complexes as targets of explanation in psychopathology: The relational analysis of phenomena approach

What is Mental Disorder? Developing an Embodied, Embedded, and Enactive Psychopathology

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