NGOs in Non-Compliance Mechanisms under Multilateral Environmental Agreements: From Tolerance to Recognition?

International Courts versus Compliance Mechanisms through the Lens of the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros and Bystroe Canal Cases

“…The participation of NGOs (or independent individuals with an NGO background within the independent Committees) can significantly strengthen the representation of public interest in the context of NCMs. 112 On the one hand, the NGO Environmental People (EPL) filed complaints under the Espoo Convention, 113 the Aarhus Convention, 114 the Bonn Convention 115 and the Danube River Protection Convention. 116 On the other hand, NGOs, including the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Danube Environmental Forum (DEF), actively supported various international monitoring bodies, providing information or technical advice.…”

Engaging civil society in global governance: lessons for member states and advice for civil society

“…For example, the compliance procedures of the Å arhus Convention permit the participation of non-governmental actors, allow them to sit on the compliance committee, and even to submit communications to the committee (UNECE, 2004;Pitea, forthcoming). Certainly, it is not unreasonable to think that some degree of efficiency may be sacrificed in the name of equity.…”

Constitutionalising Secondary Rules in Global Environmental Regimes: Non-Compliance Procedures and the Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements

“…But should they fail to do so, the wise and transparent application that the Compliance Committee has so far made of admissibility criteria has also prevented any situation coming close to an excessive workload. 126 In a similar way, since the adoption of its revised operating rules in 2008, 127 the Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention has maintained an exchange of correspondence with three Parties on the basis of information on alleged situations of noncompliance that had been provided by NGOs. However, in two of them, the Committee was satisfied with the response offered by the States concerned and did not initiate proceedings, whereas the third one -regarding the alleged violation of obligations arising for Belarus out of articles 2 and 3 of the Espoo Convention in relation with its authorities decision on the construction of a nuclear power plant -is still under consideration.…”