Nichtstun, Aufschreiben, Ausschneiden. Grenzwerte der Zusammenarbeit in der Literatur (Günther, Goethe, Schiller, Brecht)

Abstract

This article explores creative collaboration as an old, yet rarely discussed problem. It is mainly focused on literature, but the questions raised as well as the results are broadly applicable to most modern artforms that are based on a strong concept of authorship. Collaborations are familiar to all artistic genres at all times, in some periods and contexts they are even prevalent. Therefore, they currently gain notable attention in many academic disciplines, especially in the humanities but also in social sciences. In recent years the notion has become popular that in a certain way all works of art are collaborative (cf. Inge 2001, 623). One of the central points the article is trying to make is that the loose application of the concept of collaboration is clouding the view onto specific practices. At the same time, it is the main reason for the present uncertainty of what an artistic collaboration actually is or how it manifests itself in the resulting work of art. Therefore, the article explores the threshold of the concept of collaboration and presents readings of a few examples that challenge the stereotype of cooperative action as a setting of shared intentionality and stable roles of action. To make the huge field of collaborations more manageable, the article proposes to divide it into two different sets of practices: The first consists of all acts that bring texts into existence. On that level of material practices there is no need to make typological distinctions between the actors involved. It is more about the way a text is produced than who claims to be the author. Hence the question is how a person writes, on which surface and under which circumstances, if alone or interacting with others. The distinction between the author and all other actors involved in the production – the secretaries, the editors, the partners, to name only a few – is made on a second tier. It is the level of representation and representational practices. To separate the level of writing (Verfasserschaft) from the level of authorship (Autorschaft) allows a more neutral perspective on collaboration, that prevents confusion of writing with its representation. Based on Pierre Bourdieu’s Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (1972) the article proposes a praxeological approach which calls for a close look at the specific constellation of textual production. To acknowledge the symbolic value of different writing-scenes (Schreibszenen) this approach needs to be complemented by a history of reading and writing (i.a. Roger Chartier). To specify and exemplify this notion the article analyses three different settings of textual production that can all be located at the margins of collaboration. All of them show a certain way of making common practices seem extraordinary. It is not the general type of practice but the specific way it is acted out in a certain constellation that gains symbolic value. Some of the specific examples addressed are: 1) What makes Johann Christian Günthers dictation so special that it is communicated in the paratext to his poem? And is it enough to let the unknown writer escape mere instrumentality and advance to being a collaborator? 2) Can individual verses of Goethe’s and Schiller’s Xenien be perceived as collaborations even though only one of them has written them? Can, in other words, doing nothing be considered an authorial practice as long as there is a contextualizing agreement on co-authorship? 3) Can Brecht’s Kriegsfibel be considered a collaboration even though he used photos published in newspapers without permission or consent? Is intention necessary or is it possible to collaborate unknowingly? These questions are difficult to answer definitively and maybe it is not even possible to answer them with absolute certainty. But they provoke reflections on the theoretical foundation of collaboration and authorship, they let us see some of the outlines of these concepts, hence help make our ignorance ›specified‹ (Robert K. Merton).