Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency

Katsafanas, Paul

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00623.x

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…For discussions that read Nietzsche as generally sceptical about freedom of the will, see, e.g., Leiter 2001 andGemes 2009. For discussions that are critical of such readings, see, e.g., Owen andRidley 2003 andKatsafanas 2014. For a persuasive way of doing this, see Anderson 2012.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Nietzsche, Nature, Nurture

Ridley

2016

European J of Philosophy

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Nietzsche claims that we are fated to be as we are. He also claims, however, that we can create ourselves. To many commentators these twin commitments have seemed self‐contradictory or paradoxical. The argument of this paper, by contrast, is that, despite appearances, there is no paradox here, nor even a tension between Nietzsche's two claims. Instead, when properly interpreted these claims turn out to be intimately related to one another, so that our fatedness (and our acknowledgement of our fatedness) emerges as integral to our capacity to become self‐creators. The paper also offers, in the course of undermining a false alternative that is deeply entrenched in the philosophical tradition, a reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati that actually – and perhaps uniquely – makes full sense of section 276 of The Gay Science, the chief source for this aspect of his thought.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The passage is usually misread, however, as a (not particularly penetrating) contribution to the free will/determinism debate. See Ridley and Katsafanas for discussion.…”

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confidence: 99%

Nietzsche, Nature, Nurture

Ridley

2016

European J of Philosophy

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“…Elsewhere, I've argued that Nietzsche endorses a complex account of motivation, which entails that reflection is not capable of suspending the influence of motives. 28 When we appear to step back from our motives, these motives often drive the course of reflective…”

Section: The Nature Of Willingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Naturalism, Minimalism, and the Scope of Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology

Katsafanas¹

2015

Debates in Nineteenth-Century European Philosophy

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“…There are other versions of constructivism, such as Nietzschean constructivism (seeKatsafanas 2013Katsafanas , 2014Silk 2014), BAristotelian^constructivism (LeBar 2008), and alternative forms of Kantian constructivism (e.g.,Stern 2012). I set these views aside due to space constraints.…”

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confidence: 98%