No Excuses: Performance Mistakes in Morality

Amaya, Santiago; Doris, John M.

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_120

Cited by 20 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 53 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A second family of theories proposes that we punish negligent actors because we can trace their negligence to antecedent choices to exercise insufficient care (Amaya & Doris, 2015;Clarke, 2014Clarke, , 2017Frankfurt, 1971;Murray et al, 2019;Murray & Vargas, 2020;Nobes & Martin, 2022;Sher, 2009Sher, , 2017. Thus, responsibility emanates from ordinary volitional choice:…”

Section: Lack Of Due Care and "Tracing" Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence

Sarin¹,

Cushman²

2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Why do we punish negligence? Leading accounts explain away the punishment of negligence as a consequence of other, well-known phenomena: outcome bias, character inference, or the volitional choice not to exercise due care. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something both fundamental and unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they don’t arise from conscious, volitional choice. Then, drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for forgetting will help them remember in the future. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions.

show abstract

Section: Lack Of Due Care and "Tracing" Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence

Sarin¹,

Cushman²

2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…What I do deny is that ill will is necessary for blameworthiness. Amaya and Doris (, p. 269) advance a similar suggestion.…”

mentioning

confidence: 64%

“…Someone might suggest that the fact that being in a hurry or other agents' indifference affects helping behavior in a significant number of cases shows that those influences do make it unfair the hold the agent accountable. But this is unconvincing, for the reason Amaya and Doris (, p. 263) lay out: ‘The problem is that statistical considerations like this are hardly ever, at least not by themselves, sufficient to indicate that behaving appropriately posed an onerous demand. Overstaying a parking meter, for example, is common, but the fact that it happens often gives no reason to suppose that the infractions occur under duress.’…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Capacitarian Account of Culpable Ignorance

Rudy‐Hiller

2017

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Ignorance usually excuses from responsibility, unless the person is culpable for the ignorance itself. Since a lot of wrongdoing occurs in ignorance, the question of what makes ignorance culpable is central for a theory of moral responsibility. In this article I examine a prominent answer, which I call the ‘volitionalist tracing account,’ and criticize it on the grounds that it relies on an overly restrictive conception of responsibility‐relevant control. I then propose an alternative, which I call the ‘capacitarian conception of control,’ and on the basis of it I advance an account of culpable ignorance that avoids the skeptical upshots of the volitionalist proposal. If correct, my account establishes three important truths: agents can be directly in control of their ignorance, they can be directly responsible for more than actions and omissions, and their moral obligations extend beyond the performance of intentional actions and omissions.

show abstract

“…Perhaps the forgetful cook insufficiently values prudential precautions like double checking to see that the stove is off, and the slip can be characterized by the valuational theory as responsible negligence, despite it being the case that a house fire does not reflect what Murray calls the actor's “overall balance of preferences.” In other cases, perhaps there is no relevant value anywhere in the vicinity of the slip. But here, I don't find myself much inclined to attribute responsibility (p. 155), as in the unfathomably tragic cases where ordinarily conscientious parents leave their young child in the car to die of hyperthermia (for more on slips, see Amaya & Doris 2015).…”

Section: The Anti-skeptical Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborating agents: Values, sociality, and moral responsibility

Doris

2018

Behav Brain Sci

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I respond to the Behavioral and Brain Sciences commentaries on my book, Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency. I defend and amend both the skeptical challenge to morally responsible agency, that is, the book's impetus, and the anti-skeptical theory I develop to address that challenge. Regarding the skeptical challenge, I argue that it must be taken more seriously than some of my sanguine commentators assert, and consider some ways its impact might be blunted, such as by appeal to individual differences and the practical efficacy of human behavior. Regarding my positive theory, I defend the role of values in morally responsible agency against numerous criticisms, and consider various suggestions for elaborating my social, “collaborativist” account of morally responsible agency. In closing, I comment on the appropriate aspirations for theorizing about moral responsibility and agency.

show abstract

No Excuses: Performance Mistakes in Morality

Cited by 20 publications

References 53 publications

One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence

One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence

A Capacitarian Account of Culpable Ignorance

Collaborating agents: Values, sociality, and moral responsibility

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About