‘No peace, no war’ proponents? How pro-regime militias affect civil war termination and outcomes

Aliyev, Huseyn

doi:10.1177/0010836718766380

Cited by 10 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…For example, Aliyev (2017) finds that conflicts in which PGMs are present tend to last around 3 times as long as conflicts in which PGMs are not present. Aliyev (2018) also finds that PGMs can prolong civil conflicts by making a negotiated settlement less likely and reducing the possibility of one side winning, re-producing low-intensity conflict. It is not yet clear if this extends to other forms of civil violence, or if the relationship is dependent on the type of militia force (beyond the link to the government).…”

Section: Pro-government Militiasmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In addition to more violent conflict, the evidence also suggests that the use of PGMs can increase the duration of a dispute (Aliyev 2017(Aliyev , 2018Carey, Mitchell and Scharpf, 2018).…”

Section: Pro-government Militiasmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…PGM interactions with rebels may also prolong violent conflict. PGMs are usually anti-insurgent in nature and often target rebels during state-rebel peace talks, increasing the chances of spoiler activity (Steinert, Steinert, and Carey 2018; Aliyev 2018). Peace can also threaten the existence of PGMs by undermining their relationship with state benefactors and endangering their access to sources of income.…”

Section: Pgmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

Abbs

Clayton

Thomson

2019

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Existing research reveals many of the ways pro-government militia (PGM) shape civil violence but overlooks how the ethno-political ties between the state and a PGM might influence these effects. We argue that co-ethnic militia (i.e., groups composed of the ruling elite’s ethnic kin) are relatively loyal irregular forces that multiply state military capacity. The greater loyalty of co-ethnic groups mitigates principal–agent problems but further polarizes ethnic communities, and as a result, co-ethnic PGMs are likely to be associated with longer and more intense civil conflict. We test this argument on a global sample of cases from 1989 to 2007 using new data capturing the ethnic ties of all PGMs. The results support our claims that co-ethnic militia are associated with more intense and longer civil conflict.

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Section: Pro-government Militiasmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In addition to more violent conflict, the evidence also suggests that the use of PGMs can increase the duration of a dispute (Aliyev 2017(Aliyev , 2018Carey, Mitchell and Scharpf, 2018).…”

Section: Pro-government Militiasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Pgmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

Abbs

Clayton

Thomson

2019

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…A slightly different version of the same argument regarding the role of militias in intrastate conflict termination was recently developed by Huseyn Aliyev. Aliyev proposes that militias involved in intrastate conflicts tend to act as proponents of 'no peace, no war,' favoring low-activity violence and ceasefires over other conflict outcomes (Aliyev, 2019b). Militias, Aliyev argues, increase the likelihood of civil wars culminating in a stalemate or low-intensity violence because neither peace agreements nor absolute victories by either side of the dyad are in the militias' interests (ibid).…”

Section: From Militias To Civil Servantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peace Processes and the Integration of Pro-Government Militias: The Case of Village Guards in Turkey

Balta

Yüksel

Acar

2020

Armed Forces & Society

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Militia groups have only recently started to attract scholarly attention in the literature on internal conflicts. This attention is mostly focused on either the causes of their emergence or their functions and performance during the conflict. The role of militia groups in post-conflict processes, however, has not been adequately addressed. This article intends to fill this gap by analyzing the case of village guards, a type of pro-government militia system in Turkey, based on qualitative evidence from field research. While the dominant narrative in the literature identifies militia groups as spoilers in peace processes, the article shows that militias do not act as spoilers under certain conditions. In the case of the village guard system in Turkey, the permanent integration of militias into the state’s regular military apparatus prevented militia groups from acting as spoilers. It then argues that the permanent integration of wartime militia systems is a consequence of two factors: militia networking and a lack of comprehensive peace-building structures.

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“…On the one hand, peaceful conflict settlement is rarely in the interests of militias, who might lose their funding from patrons and their income from illicit activities. Indeed, PRMs are generally described as "peace-spoilers" (Aliyev, 2019a). On the other hand, governments seldom invite militias to the negotiation table, instead choosing to distance themselves from PRMs, or to completely conceal their links with militias (Ahram, 2014).…”

Section: Collateral Lethalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Are Some Civil Wars More Lethal Than Others? The Effect of Pro-Regime Proxies on Conflict Lethality

Aliyev

2019

Political Studies

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Previous large-N studies on conflict lethality have focused in large part either on structural factors or on the properties of key conflict protagonists – governments and rebels. This article challenges the dyadic two-actor approach to studying conflict lethality that examines exclusively the key actors of the dyad, and – on the example of pro-regime militias – hypothesises that participation of extra-state actors in civil wars can exert significant influence on battlefield lethality. It is proposed here that pro-regime militias can swell the number of combat deaths through, first of all, acting as ‘extra boots’ on the ground, providing governments with auxiliary forces and local intelligence, and enabling incumbents to launch more effective and often more deadly attacks on insurgents. Militias also affect the number of battle deaths by forcing rebels to protect their civilian support bases, which exposes insurgents to lethal government attacks. This assumption is empirically tested on 88 civil wars from 1981 to 2015 with militia presence. The findings show that the presence of pro-regime militias in civil wars is highly conducive to the incidence of high-casualty conflicts.

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‘No peace, no war’ proponents? How pro-regime militias affect civil war termination and outcomes

Cited by 10 publications

References 62 publications

The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

Peace Processes and the Integration of Pro-Government Militias: The Case of Village Guards in Turkey

Why Are Some Civil Wars More Lethal Than Others? The Effect of Pro-Regime Proxies on Conflict Lethality

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