2021
DOI: 10.1111/mila.12338
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Non‐human consciousness and the specificity problem: A modest theoretical proposal

Abstract: Most scientific theories of consciousness are challenging to apply outside the human case insofar as non‐human systems (both biological and artificial) are unlikely to implement human architecture precisely, an issue I call the specificity problem. After providing some background on the theories of consciousness debate, I survey the prospects of four approaches to this problem. I then consider a fifth solution, namely the theory‐light approach proposed by Jonathan Birch. I defend a modified version of this tha… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
22
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 51 publications
(22 citation statements)
references
References 51 publications
0
22
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The critique of anthropocentric high-level approaches on one extreme and anthropomorphic low-level approaches on the other extreme forms the basis of an emerging realization of the difficulties in establishing a methodology for investigating animal consciousness ( 1 , 2 ). Theories of human consciousness cannot be extended to animals without running the risk of applying them too narrowly (high-level approaches) or too broadly (low-level approaches).…”
Section: Model 3: Behavioral Flexibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…The critique of anthropocentric high-level approaches on one extreme and anthropomorphic low-level approaches on the other extreme forms the basis of an emerging realization of the difficulties in establishing a methodology for investigating animal consciousness ( 1 , 2 ). Theories of human consciousness cannot be extended to animals without running the risk of applying them too narrowly (high-level approaches) or too broadly (low-level approaches).…”
Section: Model 3: Behavioral Flexibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Theories of human consciousness cannot be extended to animals without running the risk of applying them too narrowly (high-level approaches) or too broadly (low-level approaches). Shevlin ( 2 ) calls this the specificity problem and argues that markers of consciousness (clusters of properties associated with conscious processes) can sort between likely and unlikely candidates for consciousness. Markers pick out candidate species for comparative analysis.…”
Section: Model 3: Behavioral Flexibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This method of first identifying a theory of consciousness in humans and then trying to see where it applies in other cases -is what Birch (2020) calls the theory heavy approach and one which he rightly criticizes as being difficult to apply in marginal cases. Shevlin (2021) similarly describes the 'specificity problem', in attempting to specify which cognitive mechanisms in line with a particular theory of consciousness, could be applied to nonhuman cases. Even if we were to think that these problems could be solved and that identifying a correct theory of consciousness would be the best way forwards for measurement, it takes time for different theories of consciousness to duke it out amongst each other.…”
Section: Measuring Consciousnessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is contentious whether or not consciousness comes in degrees(Shevlin 2021;Rosenthal 2019;Papineau 2003); we do not take a stance here, as whether or not consciousness comes in degrees doesn't make a difference for the arguments we present in this paper.4 Though some animals may be trained to 'report' behaviourally, at least at a very basic level, through pressing buttons or levers(Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%