Nonreciprocity and the Moral Basis of Liability to Compensate

Slavny, Adam

doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt034

Cited by 6 publications

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“…15 Without a convincing reason otherwise, we may then presume that being a beneficiary matters even when no compensatory duties are involved, as in traditional cases where the beneficiary and the NRT threat are the same person. It might be countered that previous views can be supplemented with an account of compensatory liability, according to which Beth owes compensation to Wendy and one way to discharge this obligation is by accepting a more stringent duty to avert the threat to Gary.…”

Section: Existing Explanations For the Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, some version of the Benefit Principle may be part of the best theory of compensatory liability. 15 Without a convincing reason otherwise, we may then presume that being a beneficiary matters even when no compensatory duties are involved, as in traditional cases where the beneficiary and the NRT threat are the same person. We explore this possibility further below.…”

Section: Existing Explanations For the Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Benefits, Entitlements and Non‐Responsible Threats

Slavny

2018

J Applied Philosophy

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This article offers an explanation for the proposed moral asymmetry between non‐responsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some argue that a non‐responsible threat – a person who threatens another through no fault or choice – is required to bear a greater burden to avert the threat than a bystander. I argue that previous attempts to explain this asymmetry are either incorrect or incomplete, since they either implausibly suggest that agents who do not benefit from their bodily resources, or whose bodily resources primarily benefit third parties, are liable to greater costs than a bystander, or fail to accommodate such cases. Instead, the asymmetry (when it exists) is explained either by virtue of the fact that the non‐responsible threat has a beneficiary status with respect to the threatening object, or possesses distribution‐limiting entitlements over the threatening object.

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Section: Existing Explanations For the Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Existing Explanations For the Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Benefits, Entitlements and Non‐Responsible Threats

Slavny

2018

J Applied Philosophy

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“…In Coase's (1960) terminology, nonreciprocity in the loser's property right does matter. 18 The highest degree of nonreciprocity would be recognized in intentionally trespassing registered lands or infringing corporal liberty, whereas liability for accidental torts should be distributed on a significantly reciprocal basis, as argued, for example, by Slavny (2014).…”

Section: Nonreciprocity In Initial Entitlementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional Principles of Regulatory Takings: A Utilitarian Perspective

Kim¹,

Lee²

2018

Supreme Court Economic Review

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“… 23. For further discussion on the role of avoidability as a ground of corrective duties, see Slavny (2014). …”

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confidence: 99%

On being wronged and being wrong

Slavny

2017

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we respond if V has false beliefs about whether she is harmed by D’s wrong? There are two types of cases we must consider: (1) those in which V is not harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is (2) those in which V is harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is not. I canvass three views: The Objective View, The Subjective View and The Mixed View. The Objective View holds that V’s claim depends on the correct account of harm, rather than her false beliefs, and so D has a duty to offer damages to V in (2) but not in (1) in order to compensate her. The Subjective View holds that, for broadly anti-perfectionist reasons, V’s claim depends on her sincere beliefs, even if they are mistaken, and so D has a duty to compensate V in (1) but not in (2). The Mixed View holds that we should defer to her beliefs in (1) but not in (2), so D has a duty to compensate her in both cases. In this article, I argue that we should accept The Mixed View.

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Nonreciprocity and the Moral Basis of Liability to Compensate

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Benefits, Entitlements and Non‐Responsible Threats

Benefits, Entitlements and Non‐Responsible Threats

Constitutional Principles of Regulatory Takings: A Utilitarian Perspective

On being wronged and being wrong

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