Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions

Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen

doi:10.5840/philtopics2001291/217

Cited by 713 publications

(434 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Because all items were randomized in order, the results from any particular item cannot be dismissed as contaminated by order effects such as exhaustion. Replicating previous findings (Cullen, 2010;Weinberg et al, 2001), participants in our study also demonstrated a tendency to deny knowledge on this question (Table 3). Given that this case has the structure that Starmans and Friedman identify as typical of authentic evidence cases, we would dispute Starmans and Friedman's claim that we 'do not provide evidence that laypeople deny knowledge in authentic evidence Gettier cases' (p.8).…”

Section: The Contrast Between Apparent and Authentic Evidencesupporting

confidence: 91%

“…However, the 'American Car' case (Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001), which was also included in our study, is a clear example of this type. In Starmans and Friedman's terms, the fact that justifies Bob's belief that Jill owns an American car (her longstanding possession of a Buick) is not the same as the fact that now makes his belief true (her recent acquisition of a Pontiac).…”

Section: The Contrast Between Apparent and Authentic Evidencementioning

confidence: 96%

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Authentic Gettier cases: A reply to Starmans and Friedman

2013

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Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking 'authentic evidence' Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between 'authentic evidence' and 'apparent evidence'. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands.We would like to thank Starmans and Friedman (this issue) for their careful reading of our paper and for opening up a broader discussion regarding how some of the divergent findings that have emerged in this area might be reconciled. It is important to recognize that we all agree on a core point: both philosophers and laypeople take some Gettier cases to exemplify justified true belief without knowledge. Where we appear to differ is on the question of whether laypeople respond differently to a special subset of these cases. Starmans and Friedman maintain that 'authentic evidence' Gettier cases are seen as cases of knowledge by laypeople but not by philosophers, whereas our data do not support this assertion (Nagel, San Juan, & Mar, this issue). In their reply to our article, Starmans and Friedman raise three concerns: (1) we misconstrued their contrast between authentic and apparent evidence, (2) the authentic evidence cases we used were atypical of Gettier cases in general; and (3) our methods of questioning biased participants to deny knowledge. These three concerns are potentially quite damning and we are grateful for the opportunity to address them here. On the first point, we appreciate the clarification provided by

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Section: The Contrast Between Apparent and Authentic Evidencesupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: The Contrast Between Apparent and Authentic Evidencementioning

confidence: 96%

Authentic Gettier cases: A reply to Starmans and Friedman

2013

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“…Several studies have found evidence that laypeople may judge the agents of Gettier cases to lack knowledge (Cullen, 2010;Starmans & Friedman, 2012;Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001;Wright, 2010). However, no study to date has investigated explicit attributions of justification for these cases, so the relationship between perceptions of knowledge and justified true belief remains unclear.…”

Section: Justified True Belief and Gettier Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of these studies found that the Gettier case it tested (reproduced in Appendix B) triggered different responses from members of different ethnic groups, calling into question the universality of responses to these cases (Weinberg, et al, 2001). Another study found that responses to its Gettier case were somewhat susceptible to order effects: the majority of participants gave the expected response when the case followed a clear case of knowledge or ignorance, but not after a more ambiguous case (Wright, 2010).…”

Section: Prevalence and Universality Of Epistemic Intuitions Regardinmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs

Juan²,

2013

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Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as "Gettier cases." Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers' intuitions about these cases, or whether lay intuitions vary depending on individual factors (e.g. ethnicity) or factors related to specific types of Gettier cases (e.g. cases that include apparent evidence). We report an experiment on lay attributions of knowledge and justification for a wide range of Gettier Cases and for a related class of controversial cases known as Skeptical Pressure cases, which are also thought by philosophers to elicit intuitive denials of knowledge. Although participants rated true beliefs in Gettier and Skeptical Pressure cases as being justified, they were significantly less likely to attribute knowledge for these cases than for matched true belief cases. This pattern of response was consistent across different variations of Gettier cases and did not vary by ethnicity or gender, although attributions of justification were found to be positively related to measures of empathy. These findings therefore suggest that across demographic groups, laypeople share similar epistemic concepts with philosophers, recognizing a difference between knowledge and justified true belief.

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“…The assumption seems to be making a bold empirical claim that is susceptible to empirical exploration. So in the last few years of the last century, a group of philosophers at Rutgers University decided to test the assumption (Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001;Nichols, Stich, and Weinberg 2003;Machery et al 2004). These were among the earliest studies in experimental philosophy's negative program, and many philosophers found the results quite unsettling.…”

Section: The Negative Programmentioning

confidence: 99%