Normativity and Radical Disadvantage in Bernard Williams’ Realist Theory of Legitimacy

Taking rulers' interests seriously: The case for realist theories of legitimacy

“…Importantly for Williams, the value of protection from Hobbesian fear is not properly captured by the morality system that he so thoroughly rejects in his earlier work (Williams 2011: chapter 10). It may even be that these goods are best understood in purely instrumental terms: we want to be protected from Hobbesian fear, and legitimate rulers are necessary for this end (Cross 2020a). 3 Fourth, since the source of normativity in Williams' theory of legitimacy is nothing quite so rigid as the morality system, the normative force of judgements about legitimacy is correspondingly more flexible.…”

“…In my opinion, the value of politics in Williams’ theory is best understood as stemming from some concern for the provision of certain goods that are essential to any minimal notion of human flourishing. In short, the practice of politics – which, if Williams is right, necessarily includes the creation and maintenance of institutions governed by legitimate rulers – is necessary in order to provide human beings with protection against what he identifies as materials of ‘Hobbesian fear’: starvation, murder, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and so on (Burelli 2020; Cross 2020a; Williams 2005: 4, 145). This allows us to see how legitimacy, as realists understand it, is in the interests of citizens.…”

“…Importantly for Williams, the value of protection from Hobbesian fear is not properly captured by the morality system that he so thoroughly rejects in his earlier work (Williams 2011: chapter 10). It may even be that these goods are best understood in purely instrumental terms: we want to be protected from Hobbesian fear, and legitimate rulers are necessary for this end (Cross 2020a). 3…”

“…There is already a body of realist literature exploring how citizens have an interest in being governed by rulers who meet the requirements of realist theories of legitimacy (Williams 2005: chapter 5, Burelli 2020, Cross 2020a. One might try to argue that it is comparatively less clear that the same can be said for moralist theories, and that this counts in favour of realist theories.…”

How radical is radical realism?

“…That is, we can be “confident” in a normative idea if the method of ideology critique gives us no reason to think that the idea is illusory. If critical reflection on our aversion to needless suffering gives us no reason to think that this disposition is illusory, then we have no necessary reason to object to it as a motivation for acting (Cross, 2020b, pp. 9–14).…”