Radical realism is distinguished in part from other forms of political realism by its more explicit anti-status quo objectives. In particular, radical realists generally reject the legitimacy of liberal political institutions, and often defend some version of Marxism or anarchism. However, critics of radical realism sometimes argue that radical realist's aversion to certain kinds of normative theorising hinders their capacity to criticize the status quo. This objection may therefore be best understood as one of "self-frustration," rather than "status quo bias." According to the objection, radical realists want to criticise the status quo, but their own methodological positions prevent them from doing so effectively. I have three aims in this article. First, I will clarify the kinds of normativity which radical realists do (and do not) object. Second, I will then show how this enables us to see that the self-frustration objection fails. Third, I will suggest that it is not radical realism but its critics who may have a problematic relationship with the status quo.

Several critics of realist theories of political legitimacy have alleged that it possesses a problematic bias towards the status quo. This bias is thought to be reflected in the way in which these theories are more willing to accommodate potentially severe injustices which may exist in real societies. In this article, I focus on the most widely discussed realist theory of legitimacy, namely that of Bernard Williams. I argue that it is not only free of such status quo bias; it also has considerably more radical, anti-status quo potential than what is commonly thought and, indeed, what Williams himself may have thought.

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Political realists reject the view that politics is applied morality. But they also usually claim that judgements about political legitimacy are normative. Where, then, does this normativity come from? So far, realists have given two answers: ‘concessive realism’, which identifies legitimacy as a norm internal to political practice while delegating to morality the task of explaining why this practice is valuable; and ‘naturalist realism’, which holds that alternatives to legitimate politics are not ‘real options’ for anyone. I argue that concessive realism should be rejected because it neglects the importance of the realist critique of morality. I also argue that naturalist realism should be rejected because alternatives to legitimate politics remain ‘real options’ for some people. I conclude with some thoughts on how a plausible account of the normative force of realist legitimacy should proceed.

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