North American Economic Integration

Clement, Norris; Vera, Gustavo del Castillo; Gerber, James; Kerr, William; MacFayden, Alan J.; Shedd, Stanford; Zepeda, Eduardo; Alarcón, Diana

doi:10.4337/9781840647693

Cited by 19 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…Reliance on primary industries and commodities was seen as a path to lower living standards . Critics noted that Canada is the most dependent of the G7 states on exports of natural resources (Clement , 1999) .…”

Section: Case Study: Canada's Support Formentioning

confidence: 99%

BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND PRINCIPLE: Legalization, Political Economy, and the WTO's Subsidy Agreement

McGuire¹

2002

The International Trade Journal

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Section: Case Study: Canada's Support Formentioning

confidence: 99%

BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND PRINCIPLE: Legalization, Political Economy, and the WTO's Subsidy Agreement

McGuire¹

2002

The International Trade Journal

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“…Further, influenced by the thinking of Raùl Prebisch, many developing countries did not see their future in expanding market access for traditional resourcebased products due to long term declining terms of trade in these products (Clement et al, 1999). In other words, accommodating import substitution was more important than expanding market access.…”

Section: Estey Centre Journal For Law and Economics In International mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An increasing number of developing countries had become disillusioned with the import substitution model of economic development and had embraced, instead, an export led development strategy (Clement et al, 1999). In developed countries, services were becoming the largest and fastest growing sector (Yeung et al, 1999).…”

Section: Estey Centre Journal For Law and Economics In International mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Club No More – The WTO after Doha

Kerr¹

2010

Conflict, Chaos and Confusion

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Since its inception the GATT, and subsequently the WTO, has been able to operate in a fashion that is more consistent with a club than an inclusive organization that encouraged the active participation of all its members. The WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha in November 2001 appears to have been a watershed in how the organization functions, and the club model may no longer be appropriate. While it is not yet clear what will replace the previous model, it is apparent that decision making will be much more diffused and the interests of a much broader spectrum of member countries taken into account. The central question is whether or not the transformed organization can still serve the interests of those who were previously able to dominate the club-the major trading nations. If it cannot, they may look for another club that will better serve their purposes, and all the effort that has gone into building a well functioning multilateral trade regime will have been for naught. Those members that worked so hard to end the club may not reap the benefits they expect unless they are prudent in how they use the power that they now hold within the WTO.

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“…This view was held by both the United States and Canada. The same motivation can be attributed to the extension of the Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship to include Mexico although the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) actually consists of three separate bilateral arrangements (Clement et al, 1999). Of course, the Mexican government was also motivated by a domestic reform agenda that fit well within a philosophy of economic liberalization (Gerber and Kerr, 1995).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Vested Interests in Queuing and the Loss of the WTO's Club Good: The Long-run Costs of US Bilateralism

Kerr¹

2010

Conflict, Chaos and Confusion

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In recent years the United States has actively begun to engage in the negotiation of bilateral and regional trade agreements, a significant change from its long-standing commitment to the exclusive use of multilateral institutions for trade liberalization. While the "unequal economic power" effects of the strategic use of trade policy are well understood, the long-run implications of the creation of a queue for bilateral negotiations have been less fully explored. It is argued here that queuing creates vested interests that are antipathetic to multilateralism and threaten to erode the value of the WTO's "club good". As a result, the new two-track approach of the United States to trade negotiations may not be a sustainable policy

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North American Economic Integration

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND PRINCIPLE: Legalization, Political Economy, and the WTO's Subsidy Agreement

BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND PRINCIPLE: Legalization, Political Economy, and the WTO's Subsidy Agreement

A Club No More – The WTO after Doha

Vested Interests in Queuing and the Loss of the WTO's Club Good: The Long-run Costs of US Bilateralism

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