North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy and deception

Park, Hwee-rhak

doi:10.1080/14702436.2022.2103407

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 16 publications

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“…Instead, North Korea focused on building strategic nuclear forces to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. The negotiations were nothing more than deception operations aimed at preventing the United States from launching a military strike and buying time to build up the capability to launch nuclear missiles towards the US mainland (Park, 2022, pp. 14–16).…”

Section: The Nuclear Deterrence Status Of the Korean Peninsulamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Necessity to Discuss ‘Deterrence Failure’ Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Threat

Park

2023

International Studies

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This article introduces the ‘deterrence failure’ concept and applies it to North Korea’s nuclear threat situation. For this purpose, it selects five factors, including retaliation posture; credibility of retaliation; probability of the challenger’s success; challenger’s irrational leader; and situational desperateness, to evaluate the US–South Korea nuclear deterrence posture against North Korea. Except for the retaliation posture, most factors are very concerning. Therefore, to strengthen their deterrence posture against North Korea, the United States and South Korea should take a few practical measures to ensure the implementation of the US extended deterrence, including the forward-deployment of more US retaliation assets around the Korean Peninsula.

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Section: The Nuclear Deterrence Status Of the Korean Peninsulamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Necessity to Discuss ‘Deterrence Failure’ Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Threat

Park

2023

International Studies

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A non-nuclear US ally’s nuclear preparedness dilemma: South Korea’s “Three-Axis System”

Park

2024

Defence Studies

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America's Squid Game

Ivanov

2024

Dealing With Regional Conflicts of Global Importance

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The Korean Conflict has been among the most powerful pillars of the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Yet, that balance changed after North Korea launched its nuclear program. The American presence in the region, on the other side, has had considerable implications for South Korea's national security and its capabilities to defend. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it theorizes the security dilemma between North and South Korea and calculates the probability of nuclear escalation. Second, the chapter explores the effects of North Korea's nuclear program on the bilateral relations between Washington and Seoul, particularly regarding Pyongyang's consistent rapprochement with Russia. The most important point of this study is to challenge the statement that South Korea can effectively deter the North without achieving nuclear parity with Pyongyang. Finally, the chapter stresses the difference between the Korean Peninsula's old and new realities.

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North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy and deception

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

The Necessity to Discuss ‘Deterrence Failure’ Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Threat

The Necessity to Discuss ‘Deterrence Failure’ Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Threat

A non-nuclear US ally’s nuclear preparedness dilemma: South Korea’s “Three-Axis System”

America's Squid Game

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