This paper examines South Korea’s defense preparedness against a possible North Korean nuclear attack. It applies three options of nuclear defense: preemptive attack against North Korean nuclear weapons and facilities, interception of airborne North Korean nuclear missiles, and civil defense to reduce casualties from a nuclear explosion. North Korea may have succeeded in developing about 10 nuclear weapons and making them small and light enough to be delivered by its ballistic missiles. It is imperative for South Korea to prepare defenses against a nuclear attack in the case its diplomatic efforts and deterrence measures fail. South Korea needs to be able to conduct a preemptive strike when a North Korean nuclear attack is imminent. It should also build up its ballistic missile defense systems in order to intercept any North Korean nuclear missiles that may survive a preemptive strike. Moreover, South Korea should prepare for its civil defense by constructing blast and/or fallout shelters to help more people survive a possible nuclear explosion.

This paper aims to examine the US–South Korea alliance from the perspective of the “Autonomy–Security Trade‐off” (AST) model, which was introduced by Michael F. Altfeld in the 1980s. This model could be a useful tool to ascertain the minimum conditions for the implementation of the US nuclear umbrella, which is a life‐and‐death issue for South Korea (ROK) given the serious North Korean nuclear threat. For this purpose, this paper introduces the key concept of the model and applies it to the ROK‐US alliance, analyzing the controversy over the deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) to South Korea as a case study. The analysis found that South Korea started its alliance with the United States based on the AST model. However, South Korea became reluctant in yielding its autonomy to the United States in the 1990s, and initiated “balanced diplomacy” between the United States and China and the reclaiming of the Operational Control Authority (OPCON) from the commander of the ROK‐US Combined Forces Command (CFC), a US General, in the 2000s. It delayed the deployment of the US THAAD for 3 years only because China opposed the deployment even after North Korea had succeeded to develop its nuclear weapons. However, South Korea had to return to the original AST model, albeit reluctantly, because of the emergence of a more serious North Korean nuclear threat, including hydrogen bombs. It did not try, with any great effort, to improve its relationship with China, and reduced the scope of OPCON by appointing a South Korean General as the Command of the CFC, allowing the deployment of the THAAD. Now that North Korea has the potential capabilities to strike the US mainland, South Korea cannot afford to be reluctant in yielding its autonomy to the United States. In this context, South Korea should not pursue its balanced diplomacy between the United States and China any longer. To the contrary, it should participate in the United States’ Indo‐Pacific strategy. It may also need to stop its pursuit of appointing its general as the Commander of the CFC until North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons. It should also become more willing to increase its cost‐sharing with the United States. In conclusion, South Korea should try to accept the recommendations from the AST model as long as its needs the US nuclear umbrella and wants to protect its people from the North Korean nuclear threat.

This paper identifies a gap between expectation and reality in South Korea-China relations. It applies the theory of “Autonomy-Security Trade-off” and analyzes incidents such as North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan, its bombardment of the Yeonpyeong Island, and the deployment of the U.S. THAAD system in South Korea. As a result, this paper concludes that South Korea expected more from China than it merited. Contrary to South Korean expectations, China was not ready to help South Korea on security issues. The Strategic Cooperative Partnership, which was signed in 2008 between the two countries, appeared to be just a friendly gesture, although South Korea expected cooperation in security sector. South Korea should recognize that its partnership with China cannot replace its alliance with the U.S. It should settle for economic, social, and cultural cooperation with China and maintain security cooperation with the U.S. If South Korea reminds China of this limitation in its mutual relationship, China could also settle for its cooperation with South Korea on sectors other than security. China would therefore not intervene into South Korean security decisions as we witnessed over the deployment of the U.S. THAAD system.

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