“Not See, Not Hear, Not Speak”: Preschoolers Think They Cannot Perceive or Address Others Without Reciprocity

Moll, Henrike; Khalulyan, Allie

doi:10.1080/15248372.2016.1243116

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…We take infants' proclivity to want to share experiences in joint attention [63,64], to imitate others with the goal to do what the other does [65,66], to build common ground by forming 'conceptual pacts' in conversation [67,68] and, more generally, to adopt others' stance toward the world (see [69]) to be a fundamental fact about humans that is at the basis of their social-cognitive development. In some cases, children might be said to go overboard in their adoption of others' perspectives, such as when they imitate ineffective action steps or deny the ability to see someone who cannot see them ( presumably because they make mutual visual attention a condition for seeing a person; see [70,71]). But despite the strong inclination to consider others' viewpoints, there is no solid evidence to suggest that perspective-taking occurs involuntarily or automatically.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task

Fascendini

Shoyer

et al. 2022

R. Soc. open sci.

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It is currently debated whether simple forms of social perspective-taking that are in place by late infancy are performed automatically. We conducted two experiments ( N = 124) to test whether 3-year-olds show automatic perspective-taking during object searches, and whether automatic perspective-taking is facilitated by joint attention. Children were asked to retrieve an object immediately after it was moved from one (L1) to another (L2) location within a container, e.g. a sandbox. In Experiment 1, a between-subjects design was used, with children being randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: one in which child and other jointly attended to the object in L1 (joint attention condition); one in which the other was present but unengaged with the child when the object was placed in L1 (other present condition) and a baseline condition in which only the child was present (no other condition). Automatic perspective-taking should manifest in biased searches toward L1 in the other present and joint attention conditions, but not in the no other condition. No automatic perspective-taking was observed in either experiment, regardless of whether the other person left and remained absent (Experiment 1) or returned after the object was relocated (Experiment 2). The findings contribute to a growing body of empirical data that questions the existence of automatic perspective-taking.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task

Fascendini

Shoyer

et al. 2022

R. Soc. open sci.

Self Cite

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“…This is supported by observations by Castiello and his colleagues that newborns appear to have a propensity to interact socially that seems to be in place before birth, a kind of protoconversational skill (Castiello et al, 2010). Preschoolers demand a reciprocal relatedness: They frequently deny they can see a person whose eyes are closed (Moll & Khalulyan, 2017). We only develop our explicit sense of self when we are able, through interactions with others, to develop a narrative practice (Stern, 1998).…”

Section: Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Radical enactivism: A guide for the perplexed.

Drury¹,

Tudor²

2024

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

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In the last 20 years, cognitive science has been revolutionized by enactive cognition. However, claims by enactivists that enactive cognition reforms much of our thinking about the nature of minds, and our relationships with nature and each other, have not always been easy to follow and hence a certain perplexity which has been further confounded by arguments between various enactivists. This article offers some clarification of some of the central claims of enactivism by drawing on past figures in philosophy and psychology, borrowing and extending already popularized metaphors, elucidating some key concepts, and explicating one of the central arguments within enactivism. Combining relevant inferences and intuitions from the past with recent ones from radical enactivism facilitates the emergence of a more responsible and responsive understanding of human nature: one that allows us to attune to each other and to nature more fully. Public Significance StatementOne of a number of approaches to embodied cognition, radical enactivism emphasizes the fact that our fast, intuitive, animal thinking mostly dominates our slower, social linguistic thinking. Separating and reintegrating the two furthers the pioneering work undertaken by Wittgenstein and holds the promise of rectifying our alienation from each other and from nature. This article discusses this important development in cognitive science.

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“…Our hypothesis is, therefore, that the separation that makes it possible to construct exteriority stems from a difference between seeing and being seen; between paying attention and being the object of the attention of another perceiving body. Note that this issue of non-reciprocity is particularly important in child development (Moll & Khalulyan, 2017; Reddy, 2000, 2003). In fact, to understand non-reciprocal perception is to understand that others may not pay attention to me even if I pay attention to them.…”

Section: An Individualistic Sensorimotor Solution Of Distal Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceiving at a distance: enaction, exteriority and possibility – a tribute to John Stewart

Lenay

2021

Adaptive Behavior

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The aim of this article is to offer a new approach of perception regarding the position of a distant object. It is also a tribute to John Stewart who accompanied the first stages of this research. Having already examined the difficulties surrounding questions of the perception of exteriority within the framework of enactive approaches, we will proceed in two stages. The first stage will consist of an attempt to explain distal perception in terms of individual sensorimotor invariants. This poses the problem but fails to solve it. The second stage will propose a new pathway to account for spatial perception; a pathway that does not deny the initial intuitions of the autopoietic enactive approaches, but one which radically changes the conception of cognition by considering, from the perceptual stage, the need to take into account interindividual interactions. The protocol of an original experimental study will characterize this new approach considering the perceptual experience of objects at a distance, in exteriority, in a space of possibilities without parting from the domain of interaction. To do this, we have to work at the limits of the perceptual crossing, that is, at the moment when the perceptual reciprocity between different subjects begins to disappear.

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“Not See, Not Hear, Not Speak”: Preschoolers Think They Cannot Perceive or Address Others Without Reciprocity

Cited by 9 publications

References 18 publications

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task

Radical enactivism: A guide for the perplexed.

Perceiving at a distance: enaction, exteriority and possibility – a tribute to John Stewart

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