Nyāya Perceptual Theory: Disjunctivism or Anti-Individualism?

Abstract

The thesis that error asymmetrically depends on truth is the thesis that veridicality and truth is conceptually prior to non-veridicality and error with respect to cognition and perception. Epistemic disjunctivism is the thesis that there is no common kind of experience between veridical and non-veridical states that is of robust explanatory value for the purposes of philosophical investigation into perception. In what follows the issue is explored whether Nyāya perceptual theory endorses epistemic disjunctivism or anti-individualism. It is explored against the background of examining Matthew Dasti’s (2012) argument for the view that Nyāya perceptual theory does anticipate contemporary epistemic disjunctivism on the basis of its endorsement of the parasitism of error on truth. In the present account, exploration of the issue is enhanced and better situated for further investigation by paying attention to the intricate debate between Tyler Burge and John McDowell on epistemic disjunctivism, perceptual antiindividualism, and the relevance of the vision sciences to the philosophy of perception. Following Dasti, the view is accepted that Nyāya perceptual theory endorses the idea that error is asymmetrically dependent on truth. However, the claim is drawn into question that they would genuinely accept McDowell’s form of epistemic disjunctivism. Instead, it is argued that Nyāya perceptual theory is amenable to Tyler Burge’s (2005) Perceptual Anti-individualism . The present investigation discusses the Nyāya Misplacement Theory of Illusion and closes with how this account could enhance contemporary research in epistemology and perceptual theory.

Absence: An Indo-Analytic Inquiry

“…Ganeri (2010) has offered a critique of this claim with respect to Gaṅgeśa, based on the form of epistemic naturalism that Gaṅgeśa advances. Vaidya (2013) has challenged the idea that the Nyāya defend epistemic disjunctivism. Instead, using Matilal"s (1986) account of the Nyāya Misplacement Theory of Illusion, in his (2015), he articulates and argues for the view that the Nyāya have a novel view called causal-disjunctivism, which is distinct from epistemic disjunctivism.…”

Multi-Factor Causal Disjunctivism: a Nyāya-Informed Account of Perceptual Disjunctivism

“…But MFCD, which uses both positive and negative causal conditions on the generation of a veridical perception, says nothing that rules out the existence of an external world. Rather, it would appear, as I argued in Vaidya (2013), that some of the arguments offered by Nyāya theorists, such as Vātsyāyana, are best understood as advancing PAI and not DIS. For example, Vātsyāyana says the following:…”

“…Dasti (2012) and Schiller (2019) have both argued that Nyāya perceptual theory embraces disjunctivism. Vaidya (2013) argues that Dasti's evidence falls short of showing that Nyāya would embrace McDowell's variety of disjunctivism. Vaidya (2015) argues that Nyāya would embrace some kind of causal theory of disjunctivism, which this essay aims to fill out.…”

“…In addition, consideration of Nyāya perceptual theory also allows for a distinction between perception and non-perception, where the category of non-perception is not exhausted by illusions or hallucinations. On the Nyāya causal theory of error, see Vaidya (2013Vaidya ( , 2015, illusion and hallucination are distinct from perception because of a process-wise-causal differentiation that occurs between the indeterminate (nirvikalpa, non-qualificative) first stage of perception and the determinate (savikalpa, qualificative) second stage of perception, where a subject has a person level conscious perceptual experience. In addition, there can be non-perceptions that occur because some of the conditions on perception have not been satisfied.…”

“…The snake-rope case is an excellent example for illustrating the misplacement theory of illusion as a source for generating an illusion. Matilal (1992) offers an excellent account of the misplacement theory of illusion, which is further deployed and developed by Vaidya (2013Vaidya ( , 2015. Simply put, in the snake-rope case, it is because a person has (i) a fear of snakes, (ii) possesses the concept of a snake and the concept of a rope through prior reliable interaction with snakes and ropes, (iii) snakes and ropes are objectively similar with respect to their shape, and (iv) perceptual processing is susceptible to a foul up or error with respect to assembling and transferring stage-one non-qualificative perception to stage-two qualificative perception that a person can have an appearance of a snake, take it to be real, but later discover, at a closer range, that it is a rope.…”