Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes

Abstract

It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’. I will argue that the notion of objective being can’t serve to explain or describe this “ofness” either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind’s ability to attain clear and distinct ideas.

2 | 2 | 2021 Leibniz on Language and Cognition

“…The distinction between priority and pure intellection is central to distinguish two senses of ofness (Shapiro 2012;. According to Shapiro (2012), there are two senses of 'idea of'.…”

“…The distinction between priority and pure intellection is central to distinguish two senses of ofness (Shapiro 2012;. According to Shapiro (2012), there are two senses of 'idea of'. In one sense, to have an 'idea of' something means that the idea presents what Descartes calls objective being.…”

Two Kinds of Intentionality in Locke

“…To my knowledge, violations of the Disquotation Principle have not been pointed out. In Shapiro, forthcoming I argue that Descartes too – for quite different reasons – distinguishes between two senses of ‘idea of’, one of which he explains using the Disquotation Principle, and the other of which violates this principle.…”

“…38 38 In Shapiro, forthcoming I argue that the propositional sense is also the default, pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’ employed by Descartes. …”