Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth. 12 Questions (a) and (b) were posed by a referee. 13 See J. Dodd, An Identity Theory of Truth (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, ).generalizations. Secondly, it promises a more thoroughgoing implementation of the deflationary attitude, the attitude which seeks to reveal notions of seeming metaphysical weight as mere expressive devices. 39

according to relativist accounts of discourse about, e.g., epistemic possibility and matters of taste, the truth of propositions must be relativized to nonstandard parameters. This paper argues that the central thrust of such accounts should be understood independently of relative truth, in terms of a perspectival account of assertoric force. My point of departure is a stripped-down version of Brandom's analysis of the normative structure of discursive practice. By generalizing that structure, I make room for an analogue of the "assessment sensitivity" MacFarlane characterizes in terms of relative truth. I argue that my reformulation supplies a stronger rationale for the most distinctive feature of MacFarlane's brand of relativism, its account of when speakers ought to retract assertions. Furthermore, I show that the view usually regarded as a "moderate" alternative to MacFarlane's "radical" relativism requires the more radical deviation from an absolutist account of assertoric force.

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According to commitment accounts of assertion, asserting is committing oneself to something’s being the case, where such commitment is understood in terms of norms governing a social practice. Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter elaborate and compare two types of commitment account, liability accounts (associated with C. S. Peirce) and dialectical norm accounts (associated with Robert Brandom), concluding that the latter are more defensible. Section 3 argues that both types possess an advantage over rival normative accounts of assertion in that they needn’t presuppose any notion of an assertion’s correctness. Section 4 shows how dialectical norm accounts can explain relations between assertion and truth. Section 5 sets forth objections that have been raised against commitment accounts, and argues that responses are available on behalf of dialectical norm accounts. Section 6 proposes that a liberalized dialectical norm account can illuminate phenomena sometimes seen as supporting truth relativism.

Created Out of Mind is an interdisciplinary project, comprised of individuals from arts, social sciences, music, biomedical sciences, humanities and operational disciplines. Collaboratively we are working to shape perceptions of dementias through the arts and sciences, from a position within the Wellcome Collection. The Collection is a public building, above objects and archives, with a porous relationship between research, museum artefacts, and the public.  This pre-planning framework will act as an introduction to Created Out of Mind. The framework explains the rationale and aims of the project, outlines our focus for the project, and explores a number of challenges we have encountered by virtue of working in this way.