Observations on Pierre Hadot's Conception of Philosophy as a Way of Life

Abstract

We live in an age of epigones who have persuaded themselves that the death of the master-builders is equivalent to their own originality. The message that I infer from the history of the last two centuries is that philosophy is necessarily the asking and answering of ' the big questions '. The answers may be defective in every case, but this does not invalidate the necessity of the questions....So long as we scorn these big questions, our insistence that we live in a post-philosophical age will validate itself.

Philosophy as a Way of Life Today

“…Clearly, Chase is not simply urging us to read the ancient philosophers to whom Cooper refers, nor is he obviously recommending a recuperation of the ancient philosophical framework and concepts. Rather, he is stressing an idea that is similar to the one expressed by Sellars above: philosophy as a way of life is a metaphilosophical option—a certain distinctive way of doing philosophy—that, regardless of the intrinsic peculiarities, conceptual divergences, and different philosophical landscapes of each of its representatives, has characterized a good part of the history of philosophy and, most important, might still be reactivated today (see Chase 2013, 282–83). In what follows, I would like to support the conviction shared by Sellars and Chase and, against Cooper’s objections, argue for the possibility and pertinence of philosophy as a way of life in the contemporary philosophical framework and landscape.…”

“…Contrary to many continental approaches, it is not hermetic, sarcastic, ironic, or relativistic but rather is expressed in clear, jargon‐free language. Accordingly, contrary to the way philosophy is studied in universities today, philosophy approached as a way of life guarantees “not just an accumulation of knowledge or a display of cleverness, but a process of genuine transformation,” based on a change in one’s way of looking at the world, the consequence of which is “to be in a new and different way” (Chase 2013, 266).…”

“…Curiously enough, the very dissatisfaction and disappointment that philosophy students might face when embarking on their studies is an argument used by one of Hadot’s most enthusiastic followers to encourage philosophers, researchers, and students to embrace philosophy as a way of life. After sharing his own experience of deep disillusionment with the boring, unappealing, disengaged, excessively technical and theoretical curricula of several university philosophy departments (both continentally and analytically oriented) and the illuminating impact that the discovery of Hadot’s work had on him, Michael Chase suggests that philosophy as a way of life should be attentively considered a third way of doing philosophy that is distinct from both analytic and continental traditions (2013, 280)—and, in fact, more valuable and fruitful than the alternatives, as it guarantees a process of genuine self‐transformation (266). According to Chase, this is the most valuable account of philosophy there can be, the only one that can make sense and appeal to a person who is genuinely engaged with philosophy, and also the only one that preserves philosophy’s original and authentic role and task.…”

Logics of war: explanations for limited and unlimited conflicts

“…144 The policy also had the benefi t, at least from the American perspective, of postponing discussions of postwar spheres of infl uence, which in Roosevelt's view could only foster Allied disunity. 145 The problem with this argument, however, is that it is more useful for explaining why the Allies decided to make the unconditional surrender policy public than why they decided on the more general policy in the fi rst place. The Casablanca announcement was no doubt driven largely by alliance politics, but as the discussion of the historical origins of the policy above demonstrates, it was only a public statement of a decision that had been made some time earlier.…”

“…In the words of the Duke of Argyll, a member of the Aberdeen cabinet, "There was in the mind of all of us one unspoken but indelible opinion-that the absorption by Russia of Turkey in Europe, and the seating of the Russian [145] emperor on the throne of Constantinople, would give to Russia an overbearing weight in Europe, dangerous to all the other Powers and to the liberties of the world." 7 This logic is what we would expect were the preventive motive for war in action: the British feared that left unchecked the Russians would precipitate the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and benefi t from the consequences, putting themselves in a position to threaten British interests around the world.…”