Observing Unexpected Patterns in Cross-National Research: Blame Data, Theory, or Both? Attitudes toward Redistributive Taxation in Thirty-Three Countries

Abstract

This article examines the relationships between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward redistributive taxation across 33 countries using the complete International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2006 data set. We apply a simple rational-choice-inspired homo-economicus hypothesis proposing that those better off in the socioeconomic hierarchy should have less reason to support state-organized economic redistribution compared to those situated at lower levels in the socioeconomic hierarchy. The empirical results demonstrate substantial crosscountry variation regarding the correspondence between empirical observations and theoretical expectations. When faced with such tremendous cross-national variation in response patterns, a common strategy among researchers is to question the quality of the data collection procedures for those countries deviating strongly from theoretical expectations. The strategy chosen in this study is, however, different. The main argument is that an observed lack of fit between theory and empirical observations may be rooted in problems related to theory rather than the quality of data collection procedures. Building on previous research, two "cultural distance" hypotheses are formulated, both of which argue that the correspondence between the homo-economicus theory and empirics should indeed vary systematically across countries. The first focuses on the role of the welfare state and the second on the level of economic affluence and associated scientific dominance. Both hypotheses receive considerable empirical support. The relationship between socioeconomic status and support for redistributive taxation is substantially stronger in the wealthy Western welfare states-particularly among those of Northern Europe-than in the poor non-Western countries lacking any institutional design reminiscent of a welfare state.

Support for progressive taxation: self-interest (rightly understood), ideology, and political sophistication

“…Previous research has determined some important determinants of preferences on tax policy. These determinants include self-interest (i.e., those with a higher income will be less in favour of progressive taxes, or even prefer a flat tax rate), ideology (right wing citizens will favour less progressive taxes), and altruism (those who are most concerned about inequality and social exclusion will support higher tax rates for the rich) (Bechert & Edlund, 2015;Bernasconi, 2006;Cavaillé & Trump, 2015;Hennighausen & Heinemann, 2015;Limberg, 2019Limberg, , 2020Newton & Confalonieri, 1998;Roosma, van Oorschot & Gelissen, 2016).…”

“…More broadly, it is well-known that citizens tend to favour the public policies that they stand to benefit from (Armingeon & Bürgisser, forthcoming;Pitlik et al, 2011), and this could also be true for fiscal policy. In that case, those with high incomes will not only be in favour of low taxation levels; they will also be less enthusiastic about the progressive character of taxation policies, and be more likely supporters of flat taxes (Bechert & Edlund, 2015;Carroll, Dolmas & Young, 2020;Edlund, 1999;Sumino, 2016).…”

The ISSP 2016 Role of Government Module: Content, Coverage, and History

“…Answer combinations on these three items correspond to two basic preference dimensions. The first captures attitudes along the progressive/regressive taxation continuum, while the second is related to the overall level of income taxes (Bechert and Edlund 2015;Barnes 2015).…”

Government Redistribution and Public Opinion: A Matter of Contention or Consensus?

“…Observing unexpected patterns in cross-national research, one way to respond is to question the quality of the data for those deviant cases from theoretical expectations and remove them from the analysis. The other strategy is to examine whether the lack of fit between theory and observations is rooted in the theory or its untested assumptions (Bechert and Edlund 2015). I chose the latter strategy since there is little ground to suspect the data quality for the deviant cases.…”