This article examines the relationships between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward redistributive taxation across 33 countries using the complete International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2006 data set. We apply a simple rational-choice-inspired homo-economicus hypothesis proposing that those better off in the socioeconomic hierarchy should have less reason to support state-organized economic redistribution compared to those situated at lower levels in the socioeconomic hierarchy. The empirical results demonstrate substantial crosscountry variation regarding the correspondence between empirical observations and theoretical expectations. When faced with such tremendous cross-national variation in response patterns, a common strategy among researchers is to question the quality of the data collection procedures for those countries deviating strongly from theoretical expectations. The strategy chosen in this study is, however, different. The main argument is that an observed lack of fit between theory and empirical observations may be rooted in problems related to theory rather than the quality of data collection procedures. Building on previous research, two "cultural distance" hypotheses are formulated, both of which argue that the correspondence between the homo-economicus theory and empirics should indeed vary systematically across countries. The first focuses on the role of the welfare state and the second on the level of economic affluence and associated scientific dominance. Both hypotheses receive considerable empirical support. The relationship between socioeconomic status and support for redistributive taxation is substantially stronger in the wealthy Western welfare states-particularly among those of Northern Europe-than in the poor non-Western countries lacking any institutional design reminiscent of a welfare state.

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This paper explores how atheism relates to national pride. Previous research reports the strong positive relationship between religiosity and national pride. Inversely, it can be assumed that atheists feel less national pride. Whether this assumption holds true and whether the perceived relevance of religiosity for values perceived as fundamental for national pride is a national-specific or a global phenomenon will be investigated here by examining attitudes towards atheists and assessing cross-nationally how proud atheists truly are of their countries. The data reveals cross-country differences in both respects. In highly religious countries, prejudice against atheists is pronounced, while atheists’ feelings of national pride indeed tend to be weaker. But what exactly predicts atheists’ feelings of national pride? For a Multilevel Analysis of this question, this article uses the ONBound database offering cumulated and harmonized data from international survey programs as well as linked country-level data on national identities and religion. Results identify countries’ ideological background as one of the crucial country-level predictors for national pride among atheists. In highly religious countries, people who deny religion also seem to possess ambivalent feelings towards their country. In turn, if the state ideology opposes religion, atheists tend to support the combination of anti-religiousness and patriotism.

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