2013
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ews046
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Occasionally Libertarian: Experimental Evidence of Self-Serving Omission Bias

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Cited by 9 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Default effects have been identified in a variety of consequential real-world decisions, such as whether to become an organ donor [31,32], the choice of retirement savings plan [13], auto insurance [12] and energy provider [33]. Presenting a choice alternative as the default has also been found to affect dictator game giving, either through a self-serving interpretation of entitlements [15], or through resolving preference uncertainty [14]. Further, Grossman [34] finds that passive defaults can affect strategic ignorance in a dictator game.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Default effects have been identified in a variety of consequential real-world decisions, such as whether to become an organ donor [31,32], the choice of retirement savings plan [13], auto insurance [12] and energy provider [33]. Presenting a choice alternative as the default has also been found to affect dictator game giving, either through a self-serving interpretation of entitlements [15], or through resolving preference uncertainty [14]. Further, Grossman [34] finds that passive defaults can affect strategic ignorance in a dictator game.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Previous research on the default effect shows that individuals are more likely to choose an alternative if it is presented as the default option (e.g. [1215]). To determine the relevance of the distinction between commissions and omissions, it is crucial to disentangle the omission effect from the effect of introducing a suggested option.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As discussed in Section II, whether earnings/endowments are determined randomly or through some aspect of "skill," or even just the distribution of initial earnings/endowments, has been shown to affect individuals' willingness to redistribute wealth under some experimental setups (Krawczyk 2010;Hayashi 2013;Esarey, Salmon, and Barrilleaux 2012b;Cappelen et al 2007). …”
Section: Iv(b) -Additional Treatmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the second, participants must choose how much the dictator will give away before knowing whether they will fill the role of the dictator or the receiver in the game, and knowing that whatever role they do not fill will be empty (i.e., it is just a one-person game). Comparing outcomes in these slightly altered dictator 1 For example, behavior is drastically different when the dictator's decision is framed as taking rather than giving (List 2007), when dictators are also given the option of taking some of their partner's allotment rather than just sharing some of their own allotment with their partner (Bardsley 2008), whether the allotments to be shared are "produced" or "earned" rather than just randomly allocated (Cappelen et al 2007;Krawczyk 2010), how many people will benefit from the redistribution decision (Andreoni 2007), when subjects are placed in identifiable groups together (Klor and Shayo 2010), when the recipient is generally agreed to be "more deserving" (Eckel and Grossman 1996), how much of the "endowment" is initially allocated to the dictator versus the "receiver" (Hayashi 2013), and when the dictator is guaranteed greater anonymity (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996). 6 games relative to the standard dictator setup can reveal the relative influence of individual monetary risk versus social altruism in sharing behavior. Rutstrom and Williams (2000) look explicitly at preferences for redistribution in a laboratory framework from a context where each individual knows where he or she lies in the income distribution when he or she proposes a level of redistribution.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…). In the context of market mechanisms, attributions of blame appear to be sensitive to the process or structure that produces an outcome (Hayashi ; Wiltermuth ). Notably, these results do not depend on hiding or otherwise obscuring information from subjects.…”
Section: The Clarity Thesis: the Difficulty Of Allocating Responsibilmentioning
confidence: 99%