“…In the second, participants must choose how much the dictator will give away before knowing whether they will fill the role of the dictator or the receiver in the game, and knowing that whatever role they do not fill will be empty (i.e., it is just a one-person game). Comparing outcomes in these slightly altered dictator 1 For example, behavior is drastically different when the dictator's decision is framed as taking rather than giving (List 2007), when dictators are also given the option of taking some of their partner's allotment rather than just sharing some of their own allotment with their partner (Bardsley 2008), whether the allotments to be shared are "produced" or "earned" rather than just randomly allocated (Cappelen et al 2007;Krawczyk 2010), how many people will benefit from the redistribution decision (Andreoni 2007), when subjects are placed in identifiable groups together (Klor and Shayo 2010), when the recipient is generally agreed to be "more deserving" (Eckel and Grossman 1996), how much of the "endowment" is initially allocated to the dictator versus the "receiver" (Hayashi 2013), and when the dictator is guaranteed greater anonymity (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996). 6 games relative to the standard dictator setup can reveal the relative influence of individual monetary risk versus social altruism in sharing behavior. Rutstrom and Williams (2000) look explicitly at preferences for redistribution in a laboratory framework from a context where each individual knows where he or she lies in the income distribution when he or she proposes a level of redistribution.…”