Occupy Wall: A Mereological Puzzle and the Burdens of Endurantism

Daniels, Paul R.

doi:10.1080/00048402.2013.820764

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…After all, many endurantists think that what it is to endure is to be multiply located: that is, to be located at multiple times (seeBarker and Dowe (2003);Daniels (2014);Eagle (2010)). …”

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confidence: 99%

Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias

et al. 2022

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People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we might conclude that they are irrational. This paper investigates one hypothesis, according to which future-bias is (at least partially) explained by our having a phenomenology that we describe, or conceive of, as being as of time robustly passing. We empirically tested this hypothesis and found no evidence in its favour. Our results present a puzzle, however, when compared with the results of an earlier study. We conclude that although robust passage phenomenology on its own probably does not explain future-bias, having this phenomenology and taking it to be veridical may contribute to future-bias.

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“…After all, many endurantists think that what it is to endure is to be multiply located: that is, to be located at multiple times (seeBarker and Dowe (2003);Daniels (2014);Eagle (2010)). …”

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confidence: 99%

Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias

et al. 2022

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“…Applications include arguments against endurantism(Effingham and Robson 2007), with a response by Smith 2009 and a reply in Effingham 2010) as well as against perdurantism(Gilmore 2007), with a response by Eagle, 2010 and a reply inGilmore, 2010). See also Donnelly (2010),Kleinschmidt (2011),Daniels (2014),Eagle (2016), and Wasserman (2018, ch. 6).4 The existence of such 'cyclical' propositions is of course contentious; but it is, for instance, a central component of the solution to the semantic paradoxes defended byBarwise and Etchemendy (1987).5 This is by itself controversial: the natural set-theoretic counterpart of parthood is the relation of set inclusion, and today most philosophers would followLewis (1991Lewis ( , 1993 in taking that to be the correct metaphysics of sets (paceOliver, 1994).…”

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confidence: 99%

Is Weak Supplementation analytic?

Cotnoir

2018

Synthese

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Mereological principles are often controversial; perhaps the most stark contrast is between those who claim that Weak Supplementation is analytic-constitutive of our notion of proper parthood-and those who argue that the principle is simply false, and subject to many counterexamples. The aim of this paper is to diagnose the source of this dispute. I'll suggest that the dispute has arisen by participants failing to be sensitive to two different conceptions of proper parthood: the outstripping conception and the non-identity conception. I'll argue that the outstripping conception (together with a specific set of definitions for other mereological notions), can deliver the analyticity of Weak Supplementation on at least one sense of 'analyticity'. I'll also suggest that the non-identity conception cannot do so independently of considerations to do with mereological extensionality.

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“…While some argue that endurantism is incompatible with eternalism (Merricks, 1994(Merricks, , 1999Dowe, 2003, 2005;Effingham and Robson, 2007;Giberman, 2017;Baron and Miller, 2018) it is generally held that the two are compatible (Haslanger, 1989;Sider, 2001;Miller, 2004;Brower, 2010;Eagle, 2010;Daniels, 2014;Wasserman, 2016). So we should not conclude that if our world is a block world, then objects must perdure.…”

Section: Persistence: Endurance and Perdurancementioning

confidence: 96%