Offence or defence? Approach and avoid goals in the multi‐agency emergency response to a simulated terrorism attack

Abstract

When operating in multiteam settings, it is important that goals are cohesive between team members, especially in high‐stakes, risky, and uncertain environments. This study explored goal consistency during a multiteam emergency response simulation. A total of n = 50 commanders from the UK Police Services, Fire and Rescue Services, and Ambulance Services took part in a simulated terrorism exercise, who were split into n = 13 teams. Each team responded to the same simulated terrorist event, which was based on a ‘Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack’ (MTFA) at a city centre train station. Data were collected using electronically time‐stamped ‘decision logs’ and post‐incident questionnaires that measured team members’ self‐reported goals. Goals that were ‘attack’ focussed (e.g., ‘treat patients’) were coded as ‘approach’ (i.e., focussed on achieving positive outcomes) and goals that were ‘defence’ focussed (e.g., protect emergency responders) were coded as ‘avoid’ (i.e., focussed on avoiding negative outcomes). It emerged that different agencies prioritized different goal types; Fire commanders initially prioritized avoid goals but then increased approach orientations, Ambulance commanders were consistently approach oriented, and Police commanders showed goal conflict (tensions between adopting approach and avoid goals). Despite goal differences, participants rated that their interagency goals were consistent in a post‐scenario questionnaire, suggesting that commanders were unaware of the nuanced differences between their agency‐specific objectives. At the multiteam level, teams who predominantly held attack/approach goals were significantly faster at decision logging early in the incident, yet defend/avoid teams were faster at decision logging later into the incident. Implications for multiteam coordination are discussed. Practitioner points The ‘save life’ goal in multiteam emergency response settings is vague and open to interpretation. This can impede coordination when agencies assume that they are working towards the same ‘save life’ goal, but are actually focussed on different and role‐specific objectives with regard to how they will achieve it. A joint decision model that helps to clarify agency‐specific tactical priorities may be more useful in multiteam contexts than one that uses ambiguous and abstract (i.e., ‘save life’) interagency goals. A focus on achieving positive outcomes (attack/approach goal; e.g., ‘treat patients’) can speed up decision‐making during the early stages of an incident, but when the situation becomes more complex and dynamic, then a focus on avoiding negative outcomes (defend/avoid goal; e.g., protect emergency responders from harm) might lead to faster action. When responding to complex emergencies, practitioners should focus on satisficing to achieve ‘least‐worst’ outcomes rather trying to maximize gains.

Decision‐making in multi‐agency groups at simulated major incident emergencies: In situ analysis of adherence to UK doctrine

“…Hutchins, , Nickerson, ), and enable a coordinated response through shared superordinate goals (cf. Power & Alison, ; Rouse et al, ; Stout et al, ).…”

“…There is already evidence suggesting that experienced practitioners do not follow normative models of decision‐making; and there is a broader literature which has identified the pitfalls and benefits of making decisions in groups rather than individually (for a recent review, Bang & Frith, ). Thematic analysis of interviews with multi‐agency group members, after they have participated in simulated major incidents, alongside other evidence which suggests that timely action can be constrained by decision inertia (e.g., Power & Alison , ; Alison et al, ; see also Janis, ; Janis & Mann, ). Here, decision inertia refers to “a process of (redundant) deliberation over possible options and in the absence of any further useful information” (Power & Alison, ); which could interact with whether a group is tolerant of uncertainty or not (e.g., Frenkel‐Brunswik, ; see also, van den Heuvel et al, ; for reviews, see Furnham & Marks, ; Hillien, Gutheil, Strout, Smets, & Han, ).…”

Information sharing in interteam responses to disaster

“…For example, during a disaster police may need to collect evidence and conduct investigations, whilst fire and ambulance focus on extracting and treating casualties. Common superordinate goals are insufficient for improving performance (Power & Alison, ); component teams must also coordinate and prioritize the order in which subgoals are addressed to avoid conflicting actions (Mathieu et al ., ). Exchanging, integrating, and interpreting information is therefore important for informing SA at individual (Endsley, ), team (Endsley & Jones, ; Wright, Taekman, & Endsley, ), and multiteam levels to ensure that subgoals between teams and agencies are compatible and directed towards achieving superordinate goals (Davison, Hollenbeck, Barnes, Sleesman, & Ilgen, ).…”

Extreme teams: Toward a greater understanding of multiagency teamwork during major emergencies and disasters.

“…Communication failures also arose when different teams or individuals perceive different messages in different ways, depending upon their own perspectives and biases (Bandow, 2001). For example, the 'save life' strategic goal commonly used by emergency teams could be interpreted in different ways by different emergency response teams with regards to whose life this referred to -the citizens in the risk area; the emergency responders operating inside the risk area; or the wider public around the risk area (Power & Alison, 2017b). Thus, there remains issues around how to facilitate timely, relevant and clear communications.…”