Oil in Chad and Equatorial Guinea: Widening the Focus of the Resource Curse

Abstract

The exploration and extraction of oil in the territorial sea of Equatorial Guinea and Chad's southern region of Doba have led to certain socio-economic and political dynamics among their populations. The literature developed around the concept of 'resource curse' is helpful in understanding how oil stimulates the governments' rentier behaviour and authoritarianism, as well as the countries' poverty and inequality. However, not all the similarities between the cases are explained by these approaches and some of the differences are relevant to understand the specific configuration of the curse in these countries. Only by taking into account historical trajectories, the particular strategies of local and non-local actors, and the international political economy in which oil is extracted and commercialised, can we properly analyse all these dynamics in their complexity.L'exploration et l'extraction du pétrole dans la mer territoriale de la Guinée équatoriale ainsi que dans la région de Doba au sud du Tchad ont donné naissance à certaines dynamiques socio-économiques et politiques au sein des populations de ces régions. La littérature qui s'est développée autour du concept de «malédiction des ressources» permet de mieux comprendre comment le pétrole renforce d'une part le comportement rentier et l'autoritarisme des gouvernements en question et d'autre part la pauvreté et les inégalités dans ces pays. Cependant, ces approches ne peuvent expliquer toutes les similitudes de cas, et certaines des différences aident à comprendre les rouages de la malédiction spécifiques à ces pays. Une analyse appropriée de ces dynamiques dans leur complexité exige de prendre en compte les trajectoires historiques, les stratégies particulières des acteurs locaux et non locaux, ainsi que le contexte économique et politique international dans lequel le pétrole est produit et commercialisé.

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