Oil in Venezuela: Triggering Conflicts or Ensuring Stability? A Historical Comparative Analysis

Abstract

Contrary to the presumption of the resource curse hypothesis, the oil exporter Venezuela has long been one of the most stable and conflict‐free countries in Latin America. The article analyzes this deviant case by employing a context‐sensitive approach which shows that the link between oil and internal conflicts or stability cannot be understood without considering crucial resource‐specific and non‐resource‐specific contextual conditions. The findings of this in‐depth case study suggest that the interplay of the relatively high oil abundance per capita, the geographical location of the oil reserves, multidimensional redistribution policies, specific political–institutional settings, and behavioral patterns of political elites best explains the generally low level of violent conflicts in Venezuela. These findings are further confirmed by a diachronic comparative analysis undertaken in the second part of this article. It is demonstrated that temporary increases in low‐level violence can be explained by historical shifts relating to several of the outlined conditions. Contrario a la hipótesis de una maldición de los recursos naturales, la Venezuela exportadora de petróleo ha sido por mucho tiempo uno de los países más estables y libre de conflictos en América Latina. El artículo analiza este caso empleando un enfoque sensible al contexto, haciendo evidente que la relación entre el petróleo y los conflictos internos o la estabilidad no puede ser comprendida sin considerar condiciones cruciales en contextos dependientes e independientes de los recursos. Los hallazgos de este estudio exhaustivo sugieren que la interacción de una abundancia de petróleo per cápita relativamente alta, la ubicación geográfica de las reservas petroleras, políticas de redistribución multidimensional, una configuración político‐institucional específica y patrones de comportamiento de la élite política explican de una mejor manera los bajos niveles de conflictos violentos en Venezuela. Estos hallazgos son a su vez confirmados por un análisis comparativo diacrónico, realizado en la segunda parte de este artículo. Es demostrado que aumentos temporales en bajos niveles de violencia pueden ser explicados por cambios históricos relacionados con las condiciones previamente mencionadas.

Drilling Deeper: A Systematic, Context-Sensitive Investigation of Causal Mechanisms in the Oil–Conflict Link

“…The Algerian case suggests that massive violence results from entrenched conflict between the state and its society, in which several mechanisms and conditions interact: nationwide economic grievances, partly oil-driven, are channelled into a cohesive and marked ideological (religious) opposition with a sound organisational basis; the political system fails, however, to accommodate grievances and blocks reform or transition, thus provoking even more violent reactions. Applying this explanatory model to the other cases shows that these causal mechanisms are either not at all or only partly present in them, thus explaining the lower levels of violence in the other cases: Venezuela is the most straightforward case, with its low level of violence (see, for example, Dunning, 2008;Mähler, 2011): first, the degree of economic grievance has historically been much lower -both at the national level and in particular in the resource region, where little economic deprivation exists. One central oil-producing region displays a higher level of economic development as compared to the national average, while the other main producing region is very sparsely populated.…”

Guyana Gold: A Unique Resource Curse?

“…It is difficult to pinpoint when, exactly, the issue was first broached but the landmark study by Sachs and Warner (1995), which explored 'a negative relationship' between resource abundance and economic growth, along with seminal works by Auty (1991Auty ( , 1993 and Karl (1997), seemed to spark more vibrant and innovative discussion in this area. Analysis of this strand of the resource curse has since been advanced by a host of quantitative studies, which use various (institutional) data to identify potential links between resource wealth and governance (for example, Ahmadov, 2014;Bergh, Mirkina, & Nilsson, 2014), as well as detailed qualitative assessments of the performance of institutions in individual countries such as Angola (Amundsen, 2014;Saka & Sani, 2012), Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2013San, 2014), Venezuela (Mähler, 2011;Mazzuca, 2013) and Chad (Gould & Winters, 2007).…”

Venezuela on the Edge of Bankruptcy: Prospects for Political Change

“…According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), real GDP is expected to fall by 25.0% in 2019. After five years of crisis, Venezuela remains trapped in a severe depression due to the collapse in petroleum exports, with a hollowing out of its internal manufacturing base and hyperinflation which is still rising (Mahler, 2011).…”