Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking

Ueda, Kaoru

doi:10.1007/s003550100140

Cited by 44 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…While many researches ignore such cases, they usually appear in models of group contests with linear costs. See Ueda (2002 Hence we assume that the value of δ i is unobservable from outside, i.e. it is private information for the members of group i, and avoid the above unrealism and suspect strategic effects.…”

Section: A Model Of Group Contests For An Impure Public Good Prizementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this case, part of the prize is divided equally among the group members (according to the egalitarian rule) and the rest is divided proportionally according to the members' efforts (according to the relative effort rule), which works as a selective incentive 6 . Lee (1995) and Ueda (2002) examine the endogenous determination of group sharing rules that belong to this class.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Prize sharing in collective contests

Nitzan

Ueda

2011

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In each group the members decide how much effort to put without observing the sharing rules of the other groups. It is shown that endogenous determination of group sharing rules completely eliminates the group-size paradox, i.e. a larger group always attains a higher winning probability than a smaller group, unless the prize is purely private. In addition, an interesting pattern of equilibrium group sharing rules is revealed: the group attaining the lower winning probability is the one choosing the rule giving higher incentives to the members. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: collective contest, mixed public-good prize, endogenous sharing rules, the groupsize paradox. Shmuel Nitzan Department of EconomicsBar Ilan University Ramat Gan, 52900 Israel nitzans@mail.biu.ac.il Kaoru Ueda Faculty of EconomicsNanzan University Nagoya, We are very much indebted to two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their most useful suggestions.2

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Section: A Model Of Group Contests For An Impure Public Good Prizementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prize sharing in collective contests

Nitzan

Ueda

2011

European Economic Review

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“…In the context of two-groups contests, monopolization refers to a situation in which one group retires from the competition (Ueda, 2002). While such a situation can never be an equilibrium when the contestants are individuals, it may occur in collective rent seeking to the extent that the members of the active group are still competing for the private part of the prize within the group.…”

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confidence: 99%

Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests

2015

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Competition between groups often involves prizes that have both a public and a private component. The exact nature of the prize not only affects the strategic choice of the sharing rules determining its allocation but also gives rise to an interesting phenomenon not observed when the prize is either purely public or purely private. Indeed, we show that in the two-groups contest, for most degrees of privateness of the prize, the large group uses its sharing rule as a mean to exclude the small group from the competition, a situation called monopolization. Conversely, there is a degree of relative privateness above which the small group, besides being active, even outperforms the large group in terms of winning probabilities, giving rise to the celebrated group size paradox.

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“…Ueda (2002) corrects this bias by characterizing all equilibria of Nitzan (1991a)'s contest model including corner equilibria. He provides exact conditions under which "oligopolization" occurs, namely the fact that some groups endogenously choose to retire from the contest.…”

Section: Endogenous Sharing Rules and Asymmetric Agents 41 Endogenoumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nitzan (1991a) proposes a sharing rule which is a convex combination of the egalitarian rule (a "soft" rule which does not give high incentives to group members) and the relative effort rule (a "hard rule" which, as in a rat race, induces group members to exert high effort). Nitzan (1991a) and (1991b) (amended by Davis and Reilly (1999) and Ueda (2002)) computes the equilibrium level of conflict under different rules. Lee (1995), Baik and Shogren (1995), Baik and Lee (1997), Noh (1999) and (2002) endogenize the sharing rule and the sizes of groups.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts

Bloch

2012

Oxford Handbooks Online

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This paper studies the endogenous formation of alliance in conflicts offering a survey of the recent literature and providing new results. We analyze the effect of group sizes on conflict, study endogenous alliance formation in a general model of conflict with linear technology and discuss recent developments of the theory of alliance formation, involving the determination of sharing rules inside the alliance and dynamic alliance formation in nested conflicts.JEL Classification Numbers: D74, D72, C72

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Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking

Cited by 44 publications

References 9 publications

Prize sharing in collective contests

Prize sharing in collective contests

Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests

Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts

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