On Correlationism and the Philosophy of (Human) Access: Meillassoux and Harman

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Speculative Realism (SR) has often been characterised as a heterogeneous group of thinkers, united almost exclusively in their commitment to the critique of what Quentin Meillassoux terms ‘correlationism’ or what Graham Harman calls the ‘philosophy of (human) access.’ The terms ‘correlationism’ and ‘philosophy of access’ are in turn often treated – at times even by Meillassoux and Harman themselves – as synonymous. In this paper, I seek to analyse these terms to evaluate their similarities, but also possible differences. I shall argue that the difference between the two terms ought to be retained and emphasised, since it hints at important differences between the positions of Harman and Meillassoux.</jats:p>

Towards an Object-Oriented Organization Theory: The Role of Entrepreneurial Objects in Organizational Emergence

“…The motto for overmining can be thought of as “things do not matter because they are not even things.” In overmining, things are determined by how they relate to and affect other things; there is no independent locus of determination for objects because they are “too deep to be real” (Harman, 2013, p. 45; see also Baranovas, 2020). Most commonly, overmining is derived from a correlationist position, which assumes that all ontological statements must include an account of how subjects are capable of accessing exterior reality (Brassier, Grant, Harman & Meillassoux, 2007; Young, 2020). In process-oriented theoretical work, overmining often takes the form of critiquing commonly held conceptions of organizational discourses and practice—especially those of market-based business firms—as ideologically controlled (Ogbor, 2000) in that they are performatively constructed, symbolically enacted, and/or doctrinally determined processes in lieu of the real.…”

“…Strictly speaking, real objects are “out there,” somewhere, and their crucial parts are entirely shut off from access by anything else (Harman, 2013). For Harman, all notions of literal access are ultimately self-negating because they hinge on an ontologically unsustainable distinction between human subjects and the world, which in philosophical discourse is often called correlationism (Brassier et al, 2007; Young, 2020). Instead, OOO posits that objects are self-determinating in the sense that they always keep something about themselves to themselves.…”

“…CCO and OOO converge on a number of important fronts, yet also diverge in ways that emphasize the respective uniqueness of their approaches to objects. In terms of convergence between CCO and OOO, first, CCO’s explicit rejection of the human mind as a primary organizing principle seems to be able to “fix” a number of the concerns voiced by speculative realists over correlationism (Brassier et al, 2007; Young, 2020). Principally, CCO holds that any object, be it a brain, a business plan, or Starship Enterprise , can be a medium through which other objects emerge (Cooren, 2020).…”

“…To adopt an OOO mindset, Harman often appears to promote a peculiar, aesthetics-based naiveté over radical doubt (Harman, 2018). Indeed, setting aside traditions of debating the possibility of accessing the world (Young, 2020) might return us to (a semblance of) innocence and the ability to see the world beyond the human mind as fascinating, fearsome, and endlessly strange (Harman, 2009a). “Allowing” ourselves to be seduced, mesmerized, and sucked into the great outdoors can open up theory to the “radically unpredictable quality of life-forms” (Morton, 2011, p. 165).…”

“…Objects are more than “something that acts” (Latour, 1996a, p. 373); OOO is interested in what objects are beyond their affects and agency (Baranovas, 2020). While relational approaches overstress the extent to which objects are defined by inter-objective relations, OOO directs attention to the qualities of objects that are not revealed in relations, thereby also refusing relationality as a worthwhile ontological theory (Young, 2020). Put differently, what makes objects distinct from each other is not their relations but the objects themselves.…”