On-Demand Receiver-Centric Channel Allocation via Constrained VCG Auction for Spatial Spectrum Reuse

Zhang, Feixiang; Zhou, Xiangwei; Sun, Mingxuan

doi:10.1109/jsyst.2019.2912757

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Kong et al (2018) developed an effective auction mechanism design for shared parking spaces and resource allocation to maximize social welfare and applied the O-VCG auction mechanism to reallocate parking space resources. Zhang et al (2019) proposed an auction mechanism with supply and demand as a new factor to maximize the social welfare of channel resource allocation and proved that real bidding was also the best strategy for secondary users. Liang et al (2020) designed VCG and bilateral auctions to solve the problem of quantity discounts that have rarely been considered in purchase auctions, both of which can achieve IR, IC, BB, and asymptotical efficiency.…”

Section: Auction Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We introduce the O-VCG auction mechanism for resource allocation with multiple types of storage orders to achieve these four important properties. Many studies (Xu and Huang, 2014;Xu et al, 2018;Zhang et al, 2019;Shao et al, 2020;Ning et al, 2021) have shown that the auction mechanism is more likely to provide higher benefits to third parties in the long run if the market efficiency is higher. Thus, this work develops a warehousing order resource allocation based on the O-VCG auction mechanism, which is of great significance to the logistics industry.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Toward resilient cloud warehousing via a blockchain-enabled auction approach

Feng

2023

Front. Eng. Manag.

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Cloud warehousing service (CWS) has emerged as a promising third-party logistics service paradigm driven by the widespread use of e-commerce. The current CWS billing method is typically based on a fixed rate in a coarse-grained manner. This method cannot reflect the true service value under the fluctuating ecommerce logistics demand and is not conducive to CWS resilience management. Accordingly, a floating mechanism can be considered to introduce more flexible billing. A CWS provider lacks sufficient credibility to implement floating mechanisms because it has vested interests in terms of fictitious demand. To address this concern, this report proposes a blockchain-enabled floating billing management system as an overall solution for CWS providers to enhance the security, credibility, and transparency of CWS. A one-sided Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (O-VCG) auction mechanism model is designed as the underlying floating billing mechanism to reflect the realtime market value of fine-grained CWS resources. A blockchain-based floating billing prototype system is built as an experimental environment. Our results show that the O-VCG mechanism can effectively reflect the real-time market value of CWSs and increase the revenue of CWS providers. When the supply of CWS providers remains unchanged, allocation efficiency increases when demand increases. By analyzing the performance of the O-VCG auction and comparing it with that of the fixed-rate billing model, the proposed mechanism has more advantages. Moreover, our work provides novel managerial insights for CWS market stakeholders in terms of practical applications.

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Section: Auction Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward resilient cloud warehousing via a blockchain-enabled auction approach

Feng

2023

Front. Eng. Manag.

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“…In contrast, we propose a new approach based on matching theory for user association and auctions for slice allocation, while considering multiple InPs that act as sellers of resources and multiple MVNOs acting as buyers. Also, the authors in [35] demonstrated that the resource allocation that maximizes social welfare can be realized by using Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Therefore, in our approach, we use the VCG mechanism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed Radio Slice Allocation in Wireless Network Virtualization: Matching Theory Meets Auctions

et al. 2020

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Wireless network virtualization has been introduced to satisfy the ever-increasing user requirements through resource sharing, and it can reduce operating costs for the network. Virtualized resources of an infrastructure provider can be allocated as slices to mobile virtual network operators to satisfy their users' demands. Thus, an efficient resource allocation method is needed. Furthermore, existing works have mostly considered resource allocation methods using one infrastructure provider in the system model. However, in realistic and practical environments, multiple infrastructure providers should be considered so that the mobile virtual network operator can choose the appropriate infrastructure provider to maximize its revenue. Therefore, in this paper, a new approach based on matching theory and auctions is proposed for slice allocation for a system with multiple infrastructure providers. Moreover, a matching algorithm and an auction are utilized to work as the distributed methods for solving the user association problem and slice allocation problem, respectively. To connect these two problems, the user association result is used as an input of the auction model so that the mobile virtual network operator can decide on the appropriate infrastructure provider to submit the bidding value. Simulation results show that the developed solutions achieve stable matching and maximize the social welfare of all bidders.

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